【原创翻译】澳专家：中日武装冲突有可能发生澳需要在中美日之间保持中立

发表于 2015-2-15 18:03

　　http://www.aspistrategist.org.au ... in-a-changing-asia/

　　来自澳大利亚战略家网站

　　澳专家：中日武装冲突有可能发生澳需要在中美日之间保持中立

　　作者：罗德·里昂，澳大利亚战略政策研究所成员

　　澳大利亚顶尖战略学者的著作清楚地表明，亚洲的战略竞争愈演愈烈，而澳大利亚正牵扯其中。在此之前，澳大利亚的学者都专注于自立自主，或者美国在亚太地区军力的持久性。随着中国的崛起，澳大利亚逐渐将中国纳入了研究的日程。去年岁末，学者们都在忙于撰写关于澳大利亚是否会卷进北亚内部冲突的文章。

　　罗布·艾森和德斯·鲍尔在澳大利亚国立大学战略与防务研究中心发表了一篇论文，文章概述了他们对北亚可能出现的态势升级情况的关注。他们对于态势的设想本质上是基于一套研判体系，即认定中日间小规模武装冲突可以迅速升级;认定美国将迅速卷入冲突;认定中国将倾向于首先使用核武器。基于上述认定，罗布和德斯为澳大利亚的决策者们制订出一些指导意见，强调有必要鼓励日中双方的领导人相信他们彼此拥有共同的利益，而不仅仅只存在竞争。另外，罗布和德斯警告称，任何支持日本和/或美国参与小规模北亚冲突的想法都将会使堪培拉卷入灾难性升级的战争中。

　　两位作者指出，美日安全同盟在某一环境下是可靠的，但在另外一种环境下就不那么让人安心了。和平时期，同盟是“阻止亚洲发生战争的屏障”，但在战时，同盟就是“使(日中)冲突进一步加剧的助燃剂”。尽管美国始终承诺进行常规交火，他们还是担心美国的介入会增加出现核武升级的可能性。

　　诚然，中日两国存在发生小规模武装冲突的可能性。罗德·里昂认为，只是存在可能性而已。当然，冲突也可能会升级——虽然也许不是以一种开放的方式。而且，美国多半会介入，因为奥巴马总统曾经说过，尖阁列岛(即钓鱼岛)处于美日同盟的框架之下，且该岛是最易引发冲突的敏感点。到目前为止，一切尚好。但前文最后一条认定内容尤其值得警醒。中方的战略规划者们如何说服领导人在这种情况下首先使用核武器，不得而知。

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　　联合国五大常任理事国在任何冲突中都不应首先使用核武器。五大常任理事国的宣言中有部分内容专门规定了他们对核武器的管理职责，即核武器只能是“最后的选择”。发生在东中国海的小规模冲突甚或中等规模冲突真的能涉及到“最后的选择”吗?罗布和德斯表示，中国担心自己的军火库不堪一击，认为“与其失掉不如用掉”。理论上说，若北京方面真的认为自己将失去核武库的话，这种论断也确凿属实。但这实在是破釜沉舟的做法：中方领导人会那么轻易就将之前三四十年的努力孤注一掷吗?

　　罗布与德斯不认为美国会首先出手打击中国的核部队;美国甚至不会对中方部队实施大规模常规打击。但罗布和德斯确信，破坏中方的指挥控制资源可以诱导中方认为自己正在失去对核部队的控制。这一点倒是真的，确实可以使中方相信。但中方一旦相信对核部队失去控制，他们将更加坚定战斗的决心。

　　尼克·比斯利和布兰登·泰勒的关注点在于：澳新美安全条约(ANZUS)将会使澳大利亚陷入北亚冲突漩涡，在他们的著作中，也能发现这种对于中日战略摩擦潜在后果的病态痴迷。尼克和布兰登同样也对态势升级大有兴趣，他们尤其与那些将澳大利亚置于漩涡中的推手志同道合。在尼克和布兰登的言论中，最具争议的当属“澳大利亚必须马上行动起来，在美国和日本的未来规划中争取一席之地，同时也要与北京方面保持最大的斡旋空间”。罗德·里昂认为还另有蹊径：澳大利亚应当设法在中国的未来规划中保持远离和中立，同时与美国和日本保持最大的斡旋空间。

　　北亚“火药桶”引发新一轮关注，此前数十年占据主导地位的朝鲜半岛问题、海峡两岸关系及南亚问题不再吸引眼球。无论读者是否赞同上述学者们的观点，澳大利亚的学者们都已将兴趣转向了亚洲地区新兴的战略平衡——不仅仅是美国与中国之间的平衡，而是亚洲各大国之间的平衡。

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　　Escalation scenarios in a changing Asia

　　Nothing so clearly signals Australia’s involvement in a more strategically competitive Asia as the writings of Australia’s leading strategic academics. In quieter times, our academics focused on the meaning of self-reliance, or the durability of American power in the Asia–Pacific. Gradually, China’s rise made its way onto the agenda. And by late last year academics were busily writing papers about whether intra-Asian conflict scenarios in North Asia might see Australia drawn in.

　　In a paper published by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at ANU, Rob Ayson and Des Ball outlined their concerns about possible escalation scenarios in North Asia. Their scenarios turn essentially upon a set of judgments that a minor armed clash between China and Japan could readily escalate; that the Americans would be drawn in quite quickly; and that China might be attracted towards early options for nuclear weapons use. Because of that possible progression, Rob and Des set out some guidance for Australian policy-makers that emphasises the need to encourage both Japanese and Chinese counterparts to believe that they share common interests, and not merely competitive ones. Moreover, they caution that ‘any ideas of supporting Japan and/or the United States in a small North Asian conflict could involve Canberra in a catastrophically escalating war’.

　　The authors portray the US-Japan security alliance as reassuring in one context, but worrying in another. During peacetime, the alliance is ‘a barrier to war in Asia’; but during wartime it’s ‘fuel for [a Japan–China] conflict’s further intensification’. In particular they worry that US entry into the conflict would increase the possibility of that escalation having a nuclear dimension, even if the US itself remains committed to a conventional exchange.

　　I buy a limited version of this argument. Yes, a minor armed clash between the two regional powers is possible: not likely, I think, but possible. And yes, that clash might escalate—albeit not in an open-ended way. Yes, the Americans probably would be drawn in, because President Obama has said that the Senkakus are covered by the US-Japan alliance, and that’s the most likely trigger point. So far, so good. But that final judgment is especially alarming. It’s hard to see how a Chinese strategic planner might convince Xi Jinping that it’d be a good idea to cross the nuclear threshold in such a case.

　　Crossing that threshold early in any conflict is not typical P5 behaviour. Part of the claim the P5 make about their responsible stewardship of nuclear weapons is that those weapons are solely ones of last resort. Would a minor clash—or even a medium-sized clash—in the East China Sea really constitute ‘last resort’? Rob and Des argue that the Chinese would be worried about the vulnerability of their arsenal and want to ‘use it rather than lose it’. In an abstract sense, the reasoning is true—if Beijing really believed it was about to lose its nuclear arsenal. But it’s a wild throw of the dice: would Chinese leaders so readily risk everything they’ve struggled so hard for during the past 30-40 years?

　　Rob and Des don’t actually suggest that the Americans would launch a first-strike against the Chinese nuclear force; nor even a substantial conventional attack against the force. But they do believe that the degradation of China’s command and control assets might tempt the Chinese to conclude that their own nuclear force was slipping out of their reach. That’s true; it might make them believe that. But believing that should give them a powerful incentive for war termination.

　　This morbid fascination with the potential consequences of China–Japan strategic frictions also found echoes in the work of Nick Bisley and Brendan Taylor, who focused on the extent to whichANZUS might suck Australia into a North Asian conflict. Nick and Brendan are also interested in escalation dynamics, especially insofar as those serve as conductors for Australia’s own involvement. Amongst their recommendations, the single most contentious must surely be that Australia should be working now to manage US and Japanese expectations that it might have a role, while creating maximum freedom of manoeuvre with Beijing. Personally, I would have cast that the other way around: we should be managing China’s expectations that we’d be uninvolved and indifferent, while exploring maximum freedom of manoeuvre with the US and Japan.

　　The new interest in North Asian flashpoints marks a clear historical shift from an earlier era when the dominant Asia–Pacific flashpoints tended to be listed as the Korean peninsula, China–Taiwan, and South Asia. That brief list remained essentially unchanged for decades. But no longer. Regardless of whether readers agree with their arguments or not, what’s striking is the new interest of Australia’s academics in the emerging strategic balances in the region—not just the balance between the US and China, but those between the Asian great powers.

发表于 2015-2-15 21:33

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【原创翻译】澳专家：中日武装冲突有可能发生澳需要在中美日之间保持中立

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【原创翻译】澳专家：中日武装冲突有可能发生 澳需要在中美日之间保持中立

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保持中立，只是初期对的不得罪的态度，后期胜负明显的时候，一定会选边站的

【原创翻译】澳专家：中日武装冲突有可能发生澳需要在中美日之间保持中立