本帖最后由 平静的海洋 于 2014-12-3 17:57 编辑
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_b0cf834e0102v483.html
编译者按：这是篇美国中央情报局内部文件，为相关部门和机构提供决策参考。由于语言文化差异，有些翻译还在进一步斟酌之中。同时, 请懂英文的朋友指出翻译错误、提出翻译意见。
通过这篇文件，我们了解到，1961年中国的人口不但没有减少，而且增加了5千万。1959年中国的国民生产总值GNP增长是33%， 1960年是16%。这在发达国家也是很少见到的成绩。让那些以美国为准绳的 美粉、美孙们，闭上你们的臭嘴吧！！ 如果哪位质疑该文的真实性，请来函告知，我会把原文图片发给你。
前边引言部分是该文件所关联的机构以及文件所要发送的机构以及保密条例。通过这些读者可以看出该文件的重要性。本人现在忽然明白，为什么1962年印度居然大胆贸然进犯中国的原因了。
另外，对于希望学习英文翻译的同学，这是一篇非常好的范文。许多句法结构和语言表达方式，译者本人也苦苦思索了许久才确定中文字词。
以下是原文和翻译稿。
National Intelligence Estimate Number 13-61
国家情报评估报告
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the National Security Agency.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
On 4 April 1961. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and persons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments.
a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
c. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, for the Department of Defense
I. Director of NSA for the National Security Agency
j. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned tot eh forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this estimate when used separately from the text, should be classified FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
DISTRIBUTION 文件发送单位
White House 白 宫
National Security Council 国家安全局
Department of State 国务院
Department of Defense 国防部
Atomic Energy Commission 原子能委员会
Federal Bureau of Investigation 联邦调查局
The Economic Situation in Communist China
共产党中国的经济境况
The Problem 问题（所在）
To assess current Chinese Communist economic difficulties, with special reference to the food situation, and to estimate their economic and political consequences: (a) over the next few years, and (b) in the event 1961 should prove a poor crop year.
为评估当前共产党中国的经济困难，特别是食品供应情况，以便预测其经济和政治后果：（a）在接下来的几年里，和（b）万一1961年又是一个歉收年。
Conclusions 结论
1. The Chinese Communist regime is now facing the most serious economic difficulties it has confronted since it consolidated its power over mainland China. As a result of economic mismanagement, and , especially, of two years of unfavorable weather, food production in 1960 was little if any larger than in 1957 - at which time there were about 50 million fewer Chinese to feed. Widespread famine does not appear to be at hand, but in some provinces many people are now on a bare subsistence diet and the bitterest suffering lies immediately ahead in the period before the June harvests. The dislocations caused by the "Leap Forward" and the removal of Soviet technicians have disrupted China's industrialization program. These difficulties have sharply reduced the rate of economic growth during 1960 and have created a serious balance of payments problem. Public morale, especially in rural areas, is almost certainly at its lowest point since the Communists assumed power, and there have been some instances of open dissidence. (Paras. 7-25)
1. 中国共党政权如今面临着其建立中国大陆政权之后最为严峻的经济困难。由于经济管理不善，特别是两年来的不利天气，1960年的食品生产与1957年的产量几乎没有变化，而那时人口却少了5千万。饿殍遍野虽没出现，但在某些省份，很多人生计困难，在煎熬中等待着六月份的收成。因“大跃进”而导致的混乱、以及苏联撤走专家技术人员，阻断了中国的工业化进程。这些困难已经大幅降低了1960年的经济增长率、也造成了收支不能平衡。公共道德、特别在农村地区，几乎可以肯定的是共党建政以来的最低点，并出现了不同政见的言论。
2. The Chinese Communist regime has responded by giving agriculture a higher priority, dropping the "Leap Forward" approach in industry, and relaxing somewhat the economic demands on the people. Perhaps the best indicator of the severity of the food shortage has been Peiping's action in scheduling the importation of nearly three million tons of food-grains during 1961, at a cost of about $200 million of Communist China's limited foreign currency holdings. (Paras. 26-30)
2. 为此，中共当局作出回应，给农业更高的优先权，放弃“大跃进”工业方案；减轻对人民群众的经济掠夺。食品短缺的严重程度，从北平计划于1961年进口300万吨粮食就可看出，耗资约2亿美元，几乎是共党中国仅有的外汇储备。
3. While normal crop weather in 1961 would significantly improve farm output over the levels of 1959 and 1960 at least two years of average or better harvests will be required to overcome the crisis and permit a restoration of the diet to tolerable levels, some rebuilding of domestic stocks, and the resumption of net food exports. If Soviet technicians in large numbers do not return to China, industrial production is likely to increase about 12 percent annually, as compared with about 33 percent in 1959 and 16 percent in 1960. (Paras. 31-35)
3. 如果1961年的天气正常，就会显著提高农业产量，期望超过1959年和1960年的收成，才能克服这一灾难，以便能够恢复最低的生活水准，所以有必要重建国内储备，继续粮食净出口。如果大量苏联技师不回中国，工业产值可能会年增加约12%左右，与此相比，1959年的工业增产33%，1960年是16%。
4. If 1961 is another poor crop year the economic and political effects for Communist China are likely to be grave. There probably would be no increase in gross national product (GNP) in 1961, and growth prospects for later years would also be affected. Unless there were substantial food imports, malnutrition and disease would become widespread, and a considerable amount of starvation probably would occur. Public disaffection probably would become a major problem for the regime, perhaps forcing it to undertake a massive campaign of threats and terror. It is unlikely even in these circumstances, however, that public disaffection could threaten continued control of China by its present leadership (Paras. 38-40)
4. 如果1961年还是一个歉收年，那么对于共党中国的经济和政治的影响极有可能是严重的。国民生产总值（GNP）在1961年可能不会增加，未来几年的增长也会受到影响。除非大量进口食品，否则营养不良和疾病肆虐将会很普遍，饿殍遍野可能会发生。公众的不满可能会成为当局的主要问题，也许会迫使其采取大规模的镇压和恐怖活动。即使在这种情况下，纵然公众怨声载道，也不可能威胁到当局对中国的领导地位。
5. We do not believe that Peiping would accept food offers from the US even under conditions of widespread famine. (Paras. 42)
5. 即使饿殍遍野，我们认为北平也不会接受美国提供的食品援助。
6. We do not believe that even famine conditions would, in themselves, cause Peiping to engage in direct military aggression. Such difficulties probably would, however, prompt Peiping to avoid actions which would exacerbate its relations with Moscow. (Paras. 40-41)
6. 纵然饿殍遍野，我们认为北平，就其自身（能力）而言，也不会军事冒险。这种困境可能会促使北平避免采取这种加剧与莫斯科的双边关系的行动。
Discussion 讨论
I. Introduction 介绍
7. The Chinese Communist regime is now facing the most serious economic difficulties it has encountered since 1949-1950. As a result of two successive years of poor harvests, the withdrawal of Soviet technicians, and the dislocations created by the "Leap Forward" , the Chinese leaders have been forced sharply to slow down the pace of the country's economic development program. The most acute of the problems is the food shortage: the output of grain in 1960 has dropped to about the 1957 level, when there were an estimated 50 million fewer popular discontent and apathy and weakened party morale.
7. 中共当局如今面临的自从1949-1950年以来最为严重的经济困难。由于连续两年的歉收，苏联技术人员的撤离，以及“大跃进”造成的混乱，中国领导人被迫大幅度放慢国家经济发展计划的步伐。最严重的问题是食品短缺：1960年的粮食产量下降到大约1957年的水平，造成普遍不满和人情冷漠，削弱了党的朝气。而1957年的人口比现在少5千万。
Discussion 讨论
I. Introduction 介绍
7. The Chinese Communist regime is now facing the most serious economic difficulties it has encountered since 1949-1950. As a result of two successive years of poor harvests, the withdrawal of Soviet technicians, and the dislocations created by the "Leap Forward" , the Chinese leaders have been forced sharply to slow down the pace of the country's economic development program. The most acute of the problems is the food shortage: the output of grain in 1960 has dropped to about the 1957 level, when there were an estimated 50 million fewer popular discontent and apathy and weakened party morale.
7. 中共当局如今面临的自从1949-1950年以来最为严重的经济困难。 由于连续两年的歉收，苏联技术人员的撤离，以及“大跃进”造成的混乱，中国领导人被迫大幅度放慢国家经济发展计划的步伐。最严重的问题是食品短缺：1960年的粮食产量下降到大约1957年的水平，造成普遍不满和人情冷漠，削弱了党的朝气。而1957年的人口比现在少5千万。
II. Communist China's Economic Difficulties 共党中国的经济困境
The Agricultural Crisis 农业灾难
8. Peiping's orthodox Communist program for economic development has been based on the belief that China could be industrialized rapidly , despite its technological backwardness and the unfavorable ratio of population to arable land. Consumption was to held in check and industrial assistance plant was to be built up with technical assistance and large-scale imports of machinery from the USSR. Agricultural, which had the threefold task of : (a) feeding a fast-growing population; (b) supplying increasing quantities of raw materials to industry; and (c) providing goods for export, was to rely primarily on labor-intensive projects and programs. The modernization of agriculture was to wait until industry developed enough to provide simultaneously the resources for further industrial growth and for increased investment in agriculture. This program involved a deliberated gamble that the thin margin between the production of food and the minimum needs of the population could be maintained. There are growing indications that Chinese leaders now realize that this gamble has not succeeded.
8. 北平正统的共产主义经济发展蓝图一直坚信，中国可以快速实现工业化，尽管其技术落后、人口和可耕地也不成比例。消费按计划，厂房设备依靠苏联的援助和大规模的进口机器。农业有三个任务：（a）养活快速增长的人口；（b）为工业提供更多的原材料；和（c）为出口提供商品，主要依靠劳动密集型产业。农业现代化就是要等到工业发展后能够提供足够的、同时为进一步的工业增长和增加农业投入的资源。这项计划犹如豪赌，食品和最低需求与生产之间的微薄利益难以保持。越来越多的迹象表明，中国领导人已经认识到，这种赌博没有成功。
9. Agricultural production, which had barely kept ahead of population growth until the past two years, has now dropped behind. The situation has become especially acute as regards foodgrains, which make up 85-90 percent of the Chinese diet. Although foodgrain production increased by an estimated 10 percent - from 168 to 185 million metric tons - during China's First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957). This was more than offset by the estimated 12 percent population increase, and only a slightly more rapid growth of other foods made possible a small improvement in the people's diet. The situation was temporarily eased by a bumper crop in 1958, when foodgrain production reached an estimated 212 million tons. During late 1958, however, the regime allowed food to be consumed through free supply in the commune mess-halls at a rate that it could not sustain. By early 1959 food reserves were already low and local shortages had appeared in many areas of the country.
9. 过去两年，农业产量刚刚领先于人口的增长，现在又落后了。粮食供应变得尤为严峻，占中国人饮食结构的85-90%。虽然粮食生产增加了约10%：从168到185百万公吨，这是中国的第一个五年计划期间（1953-1957）的产值。而12%的人口增加大大抵消了这个增加值，人们的饮食结构改进也非常小。这种情况也被1958年的歉收抵消了，当年的粮食产量达到约 二亿一千二百万吨。在1958年后期，政府公然允许人们在公社食堂免费消费，造成了供应不能持续。到1959年初，粮食储备已经很低，许多地区出现了粮食短缺情况。
10. since 1958 the problem has been greatly intensified by two consecutive poor crop years. Foodgrain production in 1959 declined to an estimated 190 million tons, and the 1960 harvest is estimated to have been only 180-190 million tons. Moreover, the quality of the Chinese diet has declined: consumption of foods rich in nutrients, such as meat, vegetable oils, and soybean products, has fallen. Thus, a very low per capita caloric intake has been sustained for nearly two years despite the heavy labor demands on the Chinese people.
10. 自1958年底以来，粮食短缺问题由于连续两年的歉收而更加严重。1959年的粮食产量下降到约一亿九千万吨，预计 1960年粮食产量只有180-190百万吨。此外，中国人的饮食质量有所下降：营养丰富的食品消费，如肉类、蔬菜油、大豆产品等都下降了。因此，一个非常低的人均卡路里摄入量已经持续了将近两年，尽管这两年中国人承担了更加繁重生产劳动。
11. Widespread famine does not appear to be at hand, but in some provinces many people are now on a bare subsistence diet and the bitterest suffering lies immediately ahead in the period before June, when the first 1961 crops will be harvested. Serious diseases of malnutrition, such as beri-beri and nutritional edema, are widespread in the worst hit areas of the country. In addition, the lack of food has increased the incidence of other types of diseases, such as tuberculosis and liver trouble. Many workers apparently are so weakened by lack of food that normal workloads cannot be performed.
11. 饥荒似乎不眼前，但在一些省份，很多人都在生存边沿挣扎，痛苦地等待着1961年6月份的收获季节。营养不良引起的疾病，如脚气、营养性水肿等，广泛分布在受灾最严重的地区。此外，食物的短缺增加了其他类型疾病的发生，如肺结核、肝病。许多工人显然是由缺乏食物而不能正常工作。
12. Although firm information is lacking, nonfood crops also experienced a poor year in 1960. The important cotton crop is estimated to have been less than in 1959, temporarily hilting growth in the textile industry and bringing on an even stricter rationing of cotton cloth. Production of oil-seeds and soybeans in 1960 probably was no higher than in 1959 and may have been somewhat lower.
12. 虽然缺乏准确资讯，1960年非食物类农作物也歉收。重要的棉花生产预计低于1959年的产量，暂时停止的纺织工业增长带来一个更严厉的棉布配给问题。1960年的种子油和大豆生产可能不会超过1959年，很可能会低于1959年的产量。
13. The recent failures of Chinese agriculture have been due principally to adverse weather conditions. It is clear that 1959 and 1960 were years of severe natural disasters in growing areas in North China were affected by severe and extended drought. In rice growing area of the Yangtze Valley and South China weather was average in 1960, and rice production was about the same as in 1959. However, some areas in the south were subjected to typhoons and floods which caused severe local rice shortages.
13. 中国农业近期的失败主要是由于不利的天气原因所致。很明显，1959年和1960年是中国自然灾害最严重的两年。1960年小麦主要产地华北地区由于严重持续的干旱，极大地影响了产量。在长江流域以及华南地区，1960年气候平常，水稻产量大约和1959年持平。然而，由于南方一些地区遭受台风影响加上洪水泛滥，造成局部地区严重的大米短缺。
14. Bad as the weather was in 1959 and 1960, the regime appears to have been deliberately exaggerating the scope of weather difficulties in order to shift blame from itself. Some of the agricultural difficulties of the past two years have resulted from excesses and mismanagement attending the "Leap Forward" efforts of commune reorganizations, vacillating policies with respect to private plots and private livestock holdings, the drive to grow more on less land, and agricultural innovations that ignored practical experience and could not be quickly assimilated under varying local conditions.
14. 1959年和1960年天气是不好，但政府似乎是夸大了气候原因而没有检讨自己的问题。过去两年的农业问题是因为管理不善和“大跃进”的影响；公社的重组尝试，摇摆不定的自留地、自留牲畜政策，在有限的土地搞密植、什么农业创新，这些都忽视了实际经验，不能很快在不同地区收到成效。
15. Peasant fatigue and apathy have also played a part. The people have been overworked for three years, their lives regimented , and they have been forced to do much work which they have felt was wasted. Finally, there have been no material rewards to compensate for the extra demands placed on them by the regime.
15. 农民的厌倦和冷漠也起到了推波助澜的作用。人们已经有连续三年的过分劳作，他们的生活受到严格管制，他们被迫做了大量的无效劳作。最终却没有任何物质奖励，来补偿政府对他们的额外要求。
Sino-Soviet Economic Relations
中苏经济关系
Sino-Soviet Economic Relations 中苏经济关系
16. The deterioration of political relations between Communist China and the USSR during 1960 further compounded Peiping's economic difficulties. In July-August the USSR abruptly withdraw all or nearly all of the 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet industrial technicians in Communist China. The removal of these technicians has retarded the schedules for the installation of equipments and the opening of new plants, and probably has caused the temporary cancellation of other projects.
16. 1960年期间，共党中国和苏联的政治关系的恶化进一步加剧了北平的经济困难。7-8月份苏联突然撤走几乎所有的2000-3000名在共党中国（工作）的苏联工业技术人员。这些人员的撤离阻碍了新厂的开工和设备安装的时间表，并可能导致其他项目的临时取消。
17. The withdrawal of technicians has been the major economic sanction applied by Moscow during the period of China's open challenge to Soviet authority in the Bloc. China's short-term indebtedness to the USSR during 1960 increased by nearly $250 million, one of several indications that the USSR did not extend its economic pressure to the point of curtailing the general flow of commodities to China. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the technicians and the cooling of political relations probably caused disruption in Sino-Soviet trade.
17. 在中国公然挑战苏联共产主义联盟期间，撤离技术人员是莫斯科对中国的主要经济制裁。中国所欠苏联的短期债务在1960年增加了近2亿5千万美元，其中一个迹象表明，苏联没有施加更大的经济压力，达到停止商品流向中国。然而，技术人员的撤离和政治关系的冷却也造成中苏贸易的中断。
18. The explanation for the shortages of petroleum products in late 1960 is unclear. These shortage have affected aircraft and military activities, truck distribution of food, and passenger transport in major cities. In previous years the USSR acted quickly to make supplementary deliveries of petroleum products when the shipments provided for in the annual trade agreement were not sufficient to last through the year. No supplementary supplies were forthcoming in 1960, although current deliveries are apparently normal. The shortage in late 1960 may have been due to Chinese reluctance to request supplementary supplies at a time of political tension and trade additional supplies but were turned down by the USSR.
18. 1960年底石油产品短缺的原因不详。石油的短缺影响了飞机和军事运作、食物的批量分配、以及各大城市的客运交通。在过去几年里，苏联很快便会交付石油产品，补充本年度贸易协定的差额。而1960年的补充供应却没有提供，尽管目前的交付还是正常的。1960年末的石油产品短缺可能是由于中国因为政治关系紧张、和贸易困境，而不愿意接受苏联补充供应，也有可能是中方要求供应，但被苏联拒绝了。
Demise of the "Leap Forward" “大跃进”的失败
19. During 1960 it became increasingly apparent that the "Leap Froward" was in fact ending and that Peiping recognized it could not continue the breakneck industrialization tempo of 1958-1959. Since 1958 men and machines had been driven at an exhausting pace with only secondary concern for cost, quality, and variety of output, maintenance of equipment, or morals of workers and party cares. Trying to go too fast with too little, the regime had been unable to maintain balance in the economy. Machines were built without spare parts and factories were constructed without adequate transportation facilities. The size and scope of many construction projects were extended at local initiative without coordination with national plans. By mid 1960 abnormal numbers of machines were breaking down, many irrigation projects were ineffective, inventories of products of little economic use were mounting, and the people were becoming unable to maintain the frantic pace of the previous two years.
19. 在1960年，越来越明显“大跃进”实际上已是行将末路，北平认识到 “大跃进”不能继续非常危险的1958-1959年工业化节奏。自1958年以来，劳动力与机器已经被消耗殆尽，至于成本、质量、花样品种、设备保养、以及工人们的道德标准和党的关怀，等等，都是第二位了。总想着以最小的成本而达到最快的发展速度，政府已经无法在经济上保持平衡。机器制造了却没有备件，工厂建好了却没有相应的交通设施。许多工程项目的规模和范围是地方的积极性扩张，而没有和国家计划相协调。到1960年中期，许多机器瘫痪，许多灌溉项目发挥不了作用，而没有任何经济价值的小型投资却在增加。人们再也无法保持前两年的那种狂热的生产节奏了。
Economic and Political Efforts of These Difficulties
20. The combined effect of two poor harvests, the withdrawal of Soviet technicians, and the failures of the "Leap Forward" has been sharply to reduce Communist China's rate of economic growth. Gross national product (GNP) , which increased by about 18 percent in 1958 and 12 percent in 1959, is estimated to have increased by about 8 percent in 1960 - approximately the average rate of increase during the First Five-Year Plan. Output of crude steel, coal, and electric power apparently reached planned levels. However, industrial production increased by an estimated 16 percent against a planned increase of about 25 percent, and light industry registered little if any advance. Industries requiring a high level of technical skill, such as military industries, aircraft, shipbuilding, and atomic energy, probably encountered difficulties as a result of the withdrawal of Soviet technicians. Total investment is estimated to have increased at about the 1959 level, but investment in the industrial sector may have declined.
20. 连续两年的歉收，苏联技术人员的撤离，加上“大跃进”的失败，这些联合作用，极大地降低了
共党中国的经济增长率。国民生产总值（GNP），1958年增加了约18%，1959年增加了12%，估计1960年增长8%，也就是第一个五年计划期间的平均水平。原钢产量，煤炭，发电量看来是达到了预期水平。然而，工业产值仅增加了16%，而计划是增加25%，轻工业注册几乎没有任何进展。工业生产是高技术含量的行业，如军事工业、飞机、造船，以及原子能，这些由于苏联技术人员的撤离而遇到了巨大困难。总投资估计保持在1959年的水平，而工业部门的投资可能下降了。
21. During the past three years Communist China has also encountered growing balance of payments problems. These problems - which arose out of the increased imports needed to support the attempted "Leap Forward" industrialization program and out of the necessity to cut back food exports - had their heaviest impact in 1960. The agricultural shortages probably caused total exports in the last half of 1960 to decline substantially. By the end of 1960, communist China had accumulated a short-term indebtedness to other Bloc countries amounting to about $600 million, over half of which had been incurred in 1960. In addition, reserves of gold and convertible currencies were reduced by nearly $200 million in 1959-1960.
21. 过去三年里，共党中国也遇到了越来越多的收支平衡问题。这些问题的产生是因为实现“大跃进”工业现代化而增加的进口设备，也因为需要而在1960年削减粮食出口。由于农业歉收而导致了1960年下半年总出口的大幅下降。到1960年底，中国累计短期负债其他联盟国家总计约6亿美元，其中一半以上发生在1960年上半年。另外，黄金以及可兑换的货币储备在1959-1960年间减少近2亿美元。
22. Less tangible but equally important have been the political repercussions of China's economic difficulties. Despite three years of tremendous effort, the Chinese people face greater personal hardships today than when the "Leap Forward" with its grandiose stoicism, and many older people, recalling mass starvation in the past, may credit the regime with preventing the situation from as yet deteriorating that far. However, under the commune system the Chinese state , rather than the family , has assumed the responsibility for providing food, and most Chinese probably place on the state the onus of responsibility for their present plight.
22. 虽不明显，但很重要的是中国的经济困难造成了政治影响。尽管三年的巨大努力，中国人民面临比在宏伟的“大跃进”运动之前更大的困难。许多老年人回忆起过去那饿殍遍野的年代，也许会相信政府能够防止事态恶化。然而，在人民公社体制下，是中国政府而不是家庭，承担提供食品的责任，大多数中国人也期待着国家能够解决他们目前的困境。
23. Moreover, the present food difficulties come atop vast social changes, exhausting labor pressures, policy vacillations, and unfulfilled promises. Present evidence suggests that large sections of the populace are disillusioned and apathetic and that confidence in the regime's policies has been badly shaken. Public morale, particularly in rural areas, is almost certainly at its lowest point since the Communist assumed power. Disaffection has in at least some instances taken the form of open dissidence, such as the appearance of anti-regime wall posters, attacks on cadres, food riots, and various forms of sabotage of production. Nevertheless, we do not believe that widespread or organized efforts at rebellion or open rejection of the regime's authority are likely in the near future.
23. 此外，目前粮食短缺问题事关社会头等大事，繁重的体力劳动，政策的摇摆不定，还有无法兑现的承诺。目前的证据表明，大多数民众都感到前景渺茫和无所期待，对当权者的政治信心已经严重动摇。公共道德，特别是在农村地区，几乎可以肯定的是，是共党执政以来的最低点。不满情绪已经至少在一些情况下取代了公开抗争的态势，如反政府的海报，攻击干部，粮食骚乱，以及各种形式的怠工现象。但我们认为：广泛的、或有组织的叛乱、或公开抗拒执政当局的行为近期是不可能出现的。
24. There is no indication that China's difficulties have caused the development of either severe factionalism within the leadership group or a challenge to Mao, although there almost certainly have been serious policy disagreements within the party. There is credible evidence that morale within the party has been shaken. The cadres have had to cope with the conflicting pressures of party orders, popular attitudes, and the often practical impossibilities of the given situation. their task has been complicated by the problem of interpreting and implementing shifting policies without incurring subsequent condemnation for "rightist" or "leftist" errors. The cadres probably are particularly resentful of the leadership's attempt to blame its failures on them. While the party almost certainly continues to be generally effective in maintaining order and discipline, we believe that its responses to the leadership are more sluggish and ill-coordinated.
24. 没有迹象表明中国的困境引起了严重的宗派主义、和发展到对领导集团或对毛的挑战，但可以肯定的是，党内出现了严重的政治分歧。据可靠证据，党内士气动摇了。干部必须要应对党内互相矛盾的命令、大众的态度，以及给定情况下、切实可行而又不可能完成的项目。他们的任务是复杂的，因为如何解释和实施政策，还要不犯 “右” 或 “左”的错误。干部尤其不满的是领导人试图把自己的过失强加在他们头上。几乎可以肯定的是，党在维持秩序和纪律方面是普遍有效的。我们认为，党对领导责任的反应是迟钝的和不协调的。
25. Little is known about the attitudes of the regular military and public security forces. They have probably experienced some hardship along with the populace, even though they still receive preferential treatment. There have been reports of active discontent here and there among the security forces, but we have no basis for interpreting these reports as typical of the attitude of the security forces in general, much less that of the regular military forces.
25. 军队和安全部门的态度知之甚少。他们可能也和大众一样也经历了一些困难，即使他们仍能得到优厚待遇。有报道称，安全部门时而出现不满事件，但是我们没有证据如何解释这些报道就是安全部门的态度，更不要说军队方面的了。
III. The Regime Remedial Efforts 当局的补救措施
26. The concern of Chinese Communist leaders over the food situation has been reflected in the emergency measures they have taken. Their major effort has been the adoption of a more rigorous rationing program both to equalize consumption throughout the country and to make sure that the limited food available is not consumed before the 1961 harvest. A cut in foodgrain rations averaging about 10 percent has been decreased to stretch available food supplies until the June harvests. Leaves have been ordered stripped from trees to be fed to animals so that food normally eaten by animals can be consumed by humans. The peasants have been permitted to have private plots once again, free markets have been allowed in at least some areas, and further modifications of the commune system have taken place. Regulations restricting food parcels from Hong Kong have been eased.
26. 中国共产党领导人对粮食形势的关注反映在他们采取的紧急措施上。他们的主要工作是一个更严格的配给计划，来均衡消费以便能够惠及全国各地，并确保有限的食物在1961年收获之前能保障供给。在粮食配给方面平均削减了10%来满足供应能够坚持到六月份的收获。政府下令用树叶喂养家畜，这样家畜的食物就可用来供给人们食用。农民允许保留自留地，有些地区开始自由交易，进一步修改人民公社化制度。限制来自香港的食品包裹的法规也放松了。
27. In addition to its efforts to stretch available supplies, the regime has taken steps to reduce the effects of the shortages. Medical survey teams have been organized to check on malnutrition, and extra rations have been provided for the worst cases. In addition, Peiping has ordered the mobilization of all medical forces to fight an increase in infectious diseases expected this spring. The regime has also introduced measures, such as the elimination of many political meetings, the provision of extra rest days, and a suspension of organized sports. Extensive as these measures are ,they appear to reflect grim determination rather than desperation on the part of the regime.
27. 除了努力拓宽供应渠道，当局逐步采取措施降低因粮食短缺所造成的影响。医疗调查小组已经开始检查营养不良，对最严重的缺粮地区增加额外的限量供应。此外，北平已下令所有能够动员的医疗队伍对抗今年春天或将出现的传染病。当局还出台了相关措施，如取消了很多政治会议，给大家更多的休息时间，停止有组织的体育运动。采取这些广泛的措施，与其说是反映了严峻的态势，不如说是暴露了当局的绝望程度。
28. The most dramatic steep taken by the regime - and perhaps the best indicator of the severity of the food shortage - is Peiping's decision to import several million tons of foodgrains. Under contracts already completed, imports of grain into China in 1961 will be nearly three million tons, most of which is scheduled for shipment in the first half of the year. The Chinese Communists are further negotiating for additional quantities of Australian and Canadian wheat - possibly to be supplied in the second half of 1961. These imports are in sharp contrast to Communist China's normal trade pattern of net exports of over one million tons of grain.
28. 当局采取的最戏剧性的、也许是最能反映食品短缺严重程度的是，北平已经决定进口数百万吨粮食。根据拟定合同，1961年中国进口粮食达到三百万吨，而其中大部分是定于今年上半年装运。共党中国准备进一步商谈从澳大利亚和加拿大进口小麦二百万吨，从阿根廷进口玉米几十万吨，这些都将在1961年下半年供应。这些进口与中国的正常贸易净出口超过100万吨的谷物情形形成了鲜明的对比。
29. Agricultural exports have been the regime's chief means of paying for the imports necessary for its industrialization program. Imports of the amounts contacted for to date - which are to be paid for in cash - will cost Peiping about $200 million, and if negotiations now underway for additional grain are successful , total foodgrain imports in 1961 will cost over $300 million. Whether or not the USSR has provided assistance to Peiping for these purchases is unknown. In any event, Peiping has increased its sales of silver bullion and has secured limited short-term credits from Hong Kong banks. In addition, it is seeking a six-month credit from Australia to cover future purchases. These measures will provide only a small part of the foreign exchange needed, however, and the major part will have to come from a cutback of industrial imports and a reduction of foreign exchange reserves, which, including gold, were estimated at only $225-350 million at the end of 1960.
29. 农产品出口是当局支付其工业化所需要的进口设施的主要手段。到目前为止根据已经签署的合约，北平所需支付的现金约二亿美元，如果正在进行的额外进口粮食的谈判成功，1961年总的粮食进口费用将超过三亿美元。苏联是否给北平提供援助目前还不清楚。不管怎么说，北平都增加了银锭销售，并从香港银行获得了有限的短期信贷。此外，北平还从澳大利亚争取到六个月的短期贷款以便进一步采购。这些措施将只提供所需的外汇的一小部分，但是，主要部分将来自削减工业品进口和减少外汇储备，其中，包括黄金储备，估计在1960年底只有225-350百万美元。
30. Peiping is also reorienting its domestic economic policies in an attempt to overcome the dislocations caused by the demise of the "Leap Forward" and the withdrawal of Soviet specialists. Although no details concerning a revised economic plan have been made public, statements on industrial policy indicate that scheduled rates of growth have been sharply reduced. The main effort in industrial construction for the next two or three years is apparently to been directed toward completing projects already begun. Quality and variety of output in industry is to receive greater attention than in the "Leap Forward " era. The rate of investment in heavy industry is to be reduced so that agriculture, light industry, mining, and transportation can catch up. If this policy is carried out, industrial investment may decline in 1961.
30. 北平重新调整了其国内经济政策以便克服 “大跃进”运动带来的灾难和苏联撤走专家而受到的影响。虽然还没有得到有关修正经济计划的细节，但从其产业政策的论述表明，预期增长率已大幅降低。在接下来的2-3年里，工业建设的主要任务是完成已经开始的项目。工业生产的质量和花色品种比在“大跃进”时期更加得到关注。重工业的投资减少，以便农业、轻工业、采矿、运输行业能够赶上。如果这一政策得到贯彻落实，1961年的工业投资可能会下降。
IV. Future Trends 未来（发展）趋势
31. China's progress in overcoming its present economic difficulties will primarily determined by the vagaries of weather and by development in Sino-Soviet relations. Whether or not Soviet technicians return to China, we believe that the bitterness of the Sino-Soviet has caused the Chinese leaders to place increased importance on achieving self-sufficiency. Once having experienced the disruption caused by a sudden withdrawal of soviet technicians, Peiping is unlikely to allow itself to become so dependent on them in the future. Recent overtures to Italian and other Western European firms to send technical specialists to Communist China suggest that the Chinese are becoming more flexible in their willingness to use Western technicians.
31. 中国在克服目前的经济困难的进程中，将主要取决于变幻无常的天气和中苏关系的进展。不管苏联技术人员回不回到中国，我们认为，中苏交恶的结果已经引起了中国领导人将越来越重视实现自给自足的能力。经历过突然撤出的苏联专家，北平再也不会让自己以后还会如此依赖他们（苏联）。最近有意大利和其他欧洲公司派遣技术人员到共党中国的议程表明，中国人在聘用西方专家方面变得更加灵活了。
32. China and the USSR are presently engaged in negotiations concerning future trade and economic relationships. We are not yet able to judge the likely outcome of these talks, but we believe that economic cooperation will not be as full as previously. Even if Soviet technicians return to China, the scope of their activities probably will be less than they were prior to mid-1960. In the absence of Soviet technicians the Chinese probably will concentrate on filling technological gaps as best they can in fields already partly developed - such as metallurgy, chemistry , and machine building - at the expense of more advanced industries.
32. 中苏正在进行有关未来双边贸易和经济合作的谈判。尽管无法判断这些会谈的结果，但我们相信，经济合作再也不会像以前那样全面了。即使苏联技术人员返回中国，其活动范围 也不会如同1960年中期那样广泛。没有了苏联技师，中国人将会尽自己的最大努力集中精力填补专业技术空缺 - 如冶金、化工、机械制造，以扩展工业现代化的进程。
33. While normal crop weather in 1961 would significantly improve farm output over the levels of 1959 and 1960, at least two years of average or better harvests will be required to overcome the crisis and permit a restoration of the diet to tolerable levels, some rebuilding of domestic stocks, and the resumption of net food exports. Over the longer term, the regime will be confronted with China's basic limitations on agricultural production, and will find it difficult to achieve increases in output commensurate with the rate of population growth. The regime appears to recognize this fact and to be reshaping its investment program to provide some additional resources for agricultural development. Although the regime will probably be able to secure the minimum essential growth in farm output, the margin over requirements will remain small owing to the basic aim of maximizing industrial expansion. In view of the vagaries of weather and the likelihood that the regime's predilection for "crash" programs will prevent a steady and orderly agricultural development, agricultural crises probably will recur from time to time.
33. 1961年如果气候正常，农业产量将会提高到1959年和1960年的水平，至少需要两年平均或更好的收成才能克服粮食危机，和恢复饮食到可以接受的水平，增加国内积累，恢复粮食出口。长期来看，当局将面临中国农业生产的基本限制，还会发现很难实现产出与人口增长平衡。当局似乎已经认识到了这一现实，所以重新安排投资计划，为农业发展提供额外的资源。尽管能够确保农业产出增长的基本要求，但工业发展的宏大目标和农业产出的巨大差距，效益仍然式微。从难以预测的天气、和当局好犯自相“撞车”发展的项目而言，平稳有序的农业发展会受到阻碍，农业危机可能会不时出现。
34. Communist China's current economic problems will also affect the amount and pattern of its foreign trade. Total exports in 1960 declined about 10 to 15 percent below the high level of 1959 and may decline still further in 1961. China probably will be forced to request Bloc countries - Chiefly the USSR - to defer the payments obligations it has incurred during recent years. Despite the strained relations between China and the USSR, we believe that Moscow will at least partially accede to such a request. Nevertheless , in view of China's reduced export capabilities and the large foodgrain imports from the West scheduled for 1961, imports of machinery and equipment - largely from the Bloc - may decline by as much as 30 percent compared to 1959 and 1960, and trade with the Free World may make up a significantly larger proportion of China's total trade.
34. 共党中国当前的经济问题也会影响对外贸易规模和模式。与1959年高水平相比，1960年出口总额下降了10-15%，1961年可能还会下降。中国可能被迫要求，东欧主要是苏联，推迟在最近几年产生的债务支付义务。尽管中苏之间的紧张关系，我们认为，莫斯科至少会部分地答应这种请求。然而，从中国降低的出口能力以及1961年拟定的大量从西方进口粮食来看，与1959年和1960年相比，进口机械、设备主要是从东欧，可能下降高达30%，而与西方自由世界的贸易额可能会占中国贸易总额的较大比例。
35. Under these circumstances in industry, agriculture, and Sino-Soviet economic relations, GNP probably will increase by about 8 percent annually during the period 1961 - 1965 - about the rate of increase during the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957). On the assumption that Soviet technicians in large numbers do not return to China, industrial production is likely to increase about 12 percent annually , as compared with about 33 percent in 1959 and 16 percent in 1960. Only limited progress is likely in the more complex branches of industry, which will have a retarding effect on China's ability to produce a modern military establishment.
35. 面对工业、农业、和中苏经济关系情况下，在1961到1965年间，国民生产总值每年可能增加约8%，也就是第一个五年计划期间（1953-1957）的平均值。如果大量苏联技师不回中国，工业年产值可能会增加约12%左右，而1959年的增长是33%， 1960年是16%。在精密仪器工业方面的进展可能是有限的，这将阻碍中国现代军事设施发展的能力。
36. The economic difficulties confronting Communist China are unlikely to have a marked effect on Peiping's foreign policy. We believe that domestic difficulties will not, in themselves, either prompt Peiping to undertake a foreign adventure in order to divert domestic discontent or to refrain from such an adventure. Nor will present economic troubles significantly affect Communist China's aid commitments to Free World countries, since these involve only a minute part of Communist China's total output.
36. 共党中国面临的经济困难不会对北平的外交政策产生明显的影响。我们认为，内部困境本身既不会促使北平以国外冒险来转移国内的不满情绪，也不会规避这种冒险。目前的经济危机更不会影响中国向自由世界国家的援助承诺，因为这些援助仅是共党中国总产量的微不足道的一部分。
37. Peiping's recent failure, particularly its inability to solve the food problem, will almost certainly have some limiting effect on the impact and attraction of Communist Asian politics. However, there is likely to develop - at least for the next few years - a less dazzled view of Communist China's economic achievements than has prevailed in recent years, especially since other Asian countries , such as Japan and India, have made relatively good economic progress during recent years.
37. 北平最近的失误，特别是解决不了粮食问题，几乎可以肯定，对共产主义亚洲政策的吸引力影响有限。然而，有可能 - 至少在未来几年，共党中国的经济成就，不会像前几年那样，令人眼花缭乱了。特别是其他亚洲国家，如日本和印度，最近几年取得了较好的经济发展。
V 应对1961年的恶劣的天气
38. Events so far have not been auspicious for this year's crops. The 1960 fall sowing was affected by drought, late harvest of summer crops, peasant apathy , and inadequate planning. As a result there apparently has been a reduction in winter crop acreage and generally late plantings. Below normal precipitation during the winter months in the North China plain - the major wheat area - has not provided favorable growing conditions for an area already short of soil moisture. However, if rainfall is adequate during the critical months of April and May a good wheat crop could still result. To date, precipitation and growing conditions in the rice producing areas of China have been about average.
38. 目前让人不太乐观的还是今年的庄稼收成。1960年秋播受到了干旱的影响，夏季作物收获晚时，以及不合时宜的计划。结果很显然，冬季作物亩产量降低，播种延后。冬季的华北平原降水偏低，主要小麦产区的土壤没有得到有利的生长条件。然而，如果关键的4-5月份降雨量充分，小麦丰收仍可在望。到目前为止，降水量在中国的水稻产区达到平均水平。
39. A poor crop year in 1961, the third consecutive such year, would probably prevent any increase in GNP. China would be forced to reduce future industrial imports even more drastically than now appears necessary in order to continue or expand food imports. If industrial crops such as cotton and other fibers failed to recover , industry, chiefly light industry, would suffer in 1962, and the regime would have an extremely difficult time maintaining even the reduced pace of economic expansion it now appears to envisage.
39. 1961年若又是一个歉收年，连续三年，国民生产总值就不会增加。中国将被迫更大幅度地减少工业产品的进口，而要继续扩大粮食进口。如果经济作物如棉花和其它纤维产品不能恢复原来的产值，工业，主要是轻工业， 在1962年的日子就不会好过，当局将更加难以面对保持已经降低了的经济增长步伐。
40. Another poor crop would probably raise extremely grave problems for the regime in China. Unless there were substantial food imports, malnutrition and disease would become widespread and a considerable amount of starvation would probably result. Party cohesion, effectiveness , and morale would drop. Public disaffection would probably become a major problem for the regime, and active resistance probably would occur, at least on a local level. If open resistance became widespread, the leadership would almost certainly undertake a massive campaign of threats and terror. While the responsiveness and effectiveness of its control apparatus would probably decline still further it is unlikely that public disaffection would threaten the regime's control of China. Hunger and wide-scale passive resistance, however, would constitute acute economic and political problems for the Chinese Communist Party and China's development programs. We do not believe that even these difficulties would, in themselves, cause Peiping to engage in direct military aggression.
40. 再一次的农作物歉收可能会给中国当局造成最为严峻的问题。除非有大量的食品进口，营养不良和疾病将会蔓延，以至出现饿殍遍野。党的凝聚力，执政的有效性，以及士气就会下降。公众的不满情绪可能会成为当局面对的主要问题，如果公开的抵抗活动出现并蔓延，执政当局将会面临大规模的恐怖和暴力事件的挑战。当局的国家机器之有效性和应对能力可能还会进一步降低，但公众的不满情绪并不会危及当局对中国的统治。然而，饥饿和大规模的消极抵抗将构成中国共党的政治和经济严峻的问题，影响中国的发展进程。即使是这样，我们认为，这些困境也不会促使北平当局从事直接的军事过激行动。
41. These circumstances probably would, however, prompt Peiping to avoid action which would exacerbate its relations with Moscow. While China would be extremely reluctant to admit its inability to feed its people, the regime probably would feel it could accept offers of food or other aid from another Communist country without too great a loss of face. Unless there is a further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, we believe that the Soviet would provide some assistance in such a time of crisis.
41. 然而，这些态势很可能更让北平避免出事，以免加剧与莫斯科的关系。一方面中国绝不会承认自己无力养活自己的人民，但当局会认为接受来自其他共党国家的食物或其它援助，不会有损脸面。除非中苏关系进一步恶化，我们认为，苏联在这个危机的时刻也会提供一些帮助的。
42. The regime has already made it clear that it will not accept food offers from the US in the present situation, and we believe that it will continue to take this position even if the 1961 crops are poor. The Chinese leaders probably will continue to take the line that China can overcome the present temporary difficulties by its own resources, that there is no famine , and that Westerners have, for ulterior motives , deliberately exaggerated the seriousness of the situation. Their principal consideration is, of course, a sense of national pride: acceptance of a food offer would be an admission that their own program had failed in an important respect, and, equally important, an acknowledgement that the West is genuinely interested in the welfare of the Chinese people.
42. 当局已明确表示，在目前情况下不会接受美方提供的食品援助，因此我们认为，即使1961年农作物歉收，当局仍然会采取这个态度。中国领导人会继续坚持这个原则，通过自己的资源克服眼前的暂时困难，才能显示出没有饥荒，而是西方人别有用心，故意夸大事态的严重性。他们主要考虑的当然是民族自豪感：接受外来食品援助，就是承认自己的计划已经失败。另外一个方面，同样重要的是，承认了西方对中国人民福祉是真心感兴趣的了。 |
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发表于 2014-12-3 17:54
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