As events this year have shown, the Vietnamese government won’t suffer any buyer’s remorse regarding its decision to invest in six Russian Kilo-class submarines in a 2009 deal worth $2.6 billion.
The government’s decision to both purchase these submarines and incorporate them strategically into a burgeoning asymmetric anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy were vindicated over the course of the dramatic saga earlier this year involving China moving its oil rig HYSY-981 into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Vietnam’s Kilos could significantly alter the current balance between China and Vietnam.
总之, 随着“基洛级”潜艇的到来, 越南可以在对华战略平衡方面变得更加主动,而北京方面部署到“越南(声称拥有主权)水域”的水面舰艇也将面临更大风险。
However, as a largely non-expeditionary force, the PLAN remains rather ill-equipped to stage an offensive against an opponent employing a submarine-enforced area denial strategy.
As Robert Farley has described in these pages, most Chinese ASW systems, like the Type 056 Corvette, the Y-8 maritime patrol aircraft, and underwater acoustic sensors ”still depend on proximity to Chinese bases for effectiveness.”
Further, the diesel-electric Kilos that Vietnam is slated to deploy are among the quietest submarines and are speculated to be more advanced than the PLAN’s 12 Kilo-class submarines.
In sum, with its Kilo-class acquisition, Vietnam is tipping the balance in its favor and substantially increasing Beijing’s perceived risk in deploying its surface ships into waters claimed by Vietnam.
Given events earlier this year, the Vietnamese are wasting little time in operationalizing the first of their Kilos.
A new Reuters report states that “the first two submarines have recently been sighted plying the Vietnamese coast on training runs.”
In comments to Reuters, an anonymous Vietnamese official notes that that the Kilos “are not our sole weapon, but part of a number of weapons we are developing to better protect our sovereignty.
In that regard, the submarines will be defensive.”
If Hanoi successfully implements its asymmetric area denial strategy with the use of its new submarines, it is likely that Beijing may focus on enforcing its territorial claims against the Philippines, where the barriers to doing so are substantially lower.
The Philippine navy largely lacks submarine capabilities and modern surface ships.
Of course, while the Kilos will be a lynchpin of Vietnam’s maritime strategy, they aren’t the only area of focus for the Vietnamese military.
Last August, shortly following a visit to Russia by Vietnamese General Phung Quang Thanh, we learned that Vietnam would effectively double its fleet of Sukhoi SU-30MK2 multirole fighters, arming them with anti-ship missiles.
Ever since the HYSY-981 crisis, Vietnamese rhetoric has been particularly pointed, reflecting Hanoi’s sensitivity to Chinese moves in the South China Sea.
Hanoi’s new submarines will help it even the odds with Beijing and could transform the geopolitical landscape in the South China Sea.