【原创翻译】顺其自然吧!美国应该庆祝自己走向衰落

登录/注册后可看大图 · 发表于 2014-6-25 17:12

　　http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/t ... ebrate-its-decline/

　　来自外交官网的文章

　　顺其自然吧!美国应该庆祝自己走向衰落

　　《衰落的积极面》一书认为美国的衰落是一件好事,尤其是对华盛顿来说。

　　奥利弗 ·斯图恩克

　　2014年6月25日

　　查尔斯·肯尼著作《衰落的积极面》向人们展示了-为什么其它地区的崛起对西方国家有好处，基本图书公司2014年出版，共256页。

　　“做世界头号大国固然有它的好处, 但可以肯定的是, 渐渐地-我们需要接受其他国家的崛起,而且不应该被它吓倒。”

　　关于全球秩序的未来，美国学者一直在争论：有认为美国将继续领导世界的(如罗伯特•卡根的《世界美国造》和布鲁斯·琼斯的《我们仍是领导者》)，也有主张美国会衰落的(如李鞍的《美国可以向中国学习什么》和史帝芬·李柏的《红色警报》)。

　　卡根和琼斯认为,中国的崛起不会威胁到美国的全球领导地位。

　　衰落论者(通常被批评人士称为悲观主义者)认为单极世界将很快结束或已经结束。

　　不过肯尼《衰落的积极面》一书的观点并未倒向任何一边。

　　该书作者早前曾说,相对衰落是不可避免的——它不是一道选择题, 也不是强硬的外交政策支持者(比如卡根)所想的那样。

　　“重要的是要认识到-恢复美国主导地位的政策注定要失败,”他写道。因为-其它地区崛起的顺利进行，对于美国来说-同样是有可取之处的。

　　肯尼认为,美国应该拥抱,而不是抵制一个“其他地区”逐渐赶上西方的世界。作者还意识到-抵制思想是违背常理的:

　　国际关系理论常常是以纯粹的相对言论呈现的。

　　现实主义立场会认为：每个国家都有可能成为世界单极强国。

　　当然,对于绝大多数人来说-这是不可能的,而且对于少数-认为这一观点合理的人来说, 这种情况也不太可能发生在每个国家身上(或认为这一观点有点愚蠢)。

　　这不是一场零和竞争, 从外交政策的立场来看-这样对待世界常常会与结局适得其反(不主张出现单极世界)。

　　肯尼评论说,美国可以借鉴英国,在衰落问题上表现得很轻松,不过-对于华盛顿特区的外国政策制定者们来说，接受这样的现实可能不太顺利。

　　他(肯尼)的论点很清晰, 但他很少作出评论:如果美国只是多极体系中的一个大国，美国公民的生活不一定就会受到影响。

　　正如他在最近的一次专栏-为了推广他的新书-中写道:

　　…世界新兴经济体的绝对规模和真正可以支撑他们的东西-之间的联系是极其(令人难以置信地)脆弱的。

　　无论中国何时问鼎世界大国榜首, 在反映国家生活质量的指标方面-它都将落后于(在这方面领先的)其他国家。

　　如果美国策略正确,中国和印度的崛起将是特大喜讯——他们的崛起将普度众生, 包括刺激美国经济。

　　在1990年至2012年之间,美国对新兴市场国家的出口比例不只增长了一倍, 如果形势继续向好发展的话，之后的出口额还会进一步飙升。

　　有趣的是,肯尼在书中还写道:二十一世纪绝对没有理由不应该是“美国的世纪”——如果美国能继续保持、甚至提升其全球声誉的话，它将成为一个人人争相效仿的国家。

　　这为我们提出了一个重要问题：难道美国是因其教育、公民权利、思想开放或其庞大的经济和军事优势得到别人青睐的吗?

　　对此-肯尼认为,硬实力并不重要。这听起来有些不可思议(原因如下)。

　　毕竟, 正是因为美国在经济和军事上获得了主宰地位(不过已经开始逐渐丧失),才使得它在过去的60年,根据自身利益、通过传播美国的价值观、思想和文化塑造了世界。

　　不过，非常值得怀疑的是：一旦中国取而代之,美国社会还会是世界上最具吸引力的吗?

　　对于一个-统治世界能力遭到不断质疑的国家(美国)来说, 没有什么比-失去世界指挥大权-更具灾难性的了。

　　最后,肯尼“快乐的衰落相对论”命题提出了一些重要问题：谁会在未来成为全球公认的“世界工厂”?谁将为海上安全保驾护航以及谁将为-像日本这样的国家提供安全保障?

　　但肯尼几乎没有提到-美国的衰退将如何影响安全竞赛趋势下的全球安全困境。

　　换句话说,就是-谁将填补美国在地缘政治上留下的这一空缺?

　　总的来说，《衰落的积极面》是一本充满有趣信息的、值得一读的好书, 他在未来全球秩序的讨论议题上做出了伟大贡献。

　　原文：

　　The US Should Celebrate Its Decline

　　The Upside of Down argues that the U.S. is declining — and that’s a good thing, especially for Washington.

　　By Oliver Stuenkel

　　June 25, 2014

　　Charles Kenny. The Upside of Down. Why the Rise of the Rest is Good for the West. Basic Books, 2014. 256 pages.

　　“Being number one has its advantages, to be sure, but increasingly, we need other countries to step up — and it shouldn’t frighten us when they do.”

　　The debate about the future of global order is dominated by U.S. scholars who believe the United States’ leadership is set to endure (such as Robert Kagan’s The World America Made, Bruce Jones’ Still Ours To Lead) and U.S. declinists (such as Ann Lee’s What the U.S. Can Learn from China and Stephen Leeb’s Red Alert).

　　Kagan and Jones believe that China’s rise will not threaten U.S. global leadership.

　　The declinists (often called pessimists by critics) believe that unipolarity is soon coming to an end or has already ended.

　　Kenny’s The Upside of Down does not easily fit into any of these categories.

　　The author early on says that relative decline is inevitable — it is not a matter of choice, as proponents of a muscular foreign policy (such as Kagan) would argue.

　　“It is important to recognize that policies to ‘regain US dominance’ are destined to fail,” he writes. The rise of the rest is not only well under way, he says, it is also desirable.

　　Kenny argues that the United States should embrace, not resist, a world in which “the rest” catch up with the West. The author is aware that this may sound counterintuitive:

　　International relations theory is too often presented in purely relative terms.

　　The realist position effectively proposes that every country is solely out to be top of the pile.

　　That’s impossible for the vast majority, of course, and dumb even for the few for whom it is plausible.

　　This isn’t a zero-sum competition, and foreign policy thinking that treats the world that way is immensely counterproductive.

　　Kenny’s comment that the United States could learn from Britain, which is quite relaxed about its decline, is not likely to go down well with foreign policy makers in Washington, D.C.

　　His argument is obvious, but rarely made: The lives of U.S. citizens would not necessarily be negatively affected if the United States were merely one of several poles in a multipolar system. As he writes in a recent op-ed promoting his book:

　　…the link between the absolute size of your economy and pretty much any measure that truly matters is incredibly weak.

　　Whenever China takes over the top spot, it will still lag far behind the world’s leading countries on indicators reflecting quality of life.

　　If the U.S. plays its cards right, the rise of China and India is terrific news — their rise will lift all boats, including that of the United States’ economy.

　　Between 1990 and 2012, the proportion of U.S. exports going to emerging countries more than doubled, and it will soon rise even further.

　　Interestingly, Kenny writes that “there is absolutely no reason why the twenty-first century should not be an ‘American Century’ — if by that is meant America retaining or even enhancing its global reputation as a country to be emulated.”

　　That raises an important question — is the United States admired for its education, civil rights, and openness, or rather because of its sheer economic and military superiority?

　　Kenny says hard power does not matter at all. That sounds somewhat improbable.

　　After all, it is precisely U.S. economic and military dominance that has allowed it, over the past six decades, to shape the world according to its interests and disseminate U.S. values, ideas and culture.

　　It seems highly questionable at best that the United States can remain the world’s most attractive society once China has overtaken it.

　　For a country that has become worryingly accustomed to ruling the world, anything but being in charge is likely to be quite catastrophic.

　　Finally, Kenny’s ‘happy relative decline’ proposition raises important questions about who will provide global public goods in the future.

　　Who will provide maritime security, and who will provide security guarantees to countries like Japan? Kenny hardly mentions how U.S. decline will affect the dilemmas of security competition.

　　Put differently, who will fill the void the United States will leave behind in geopolitics? Still, The Upside of Down is a great read full of interesting data, and a great contribution to the debate about the future of global order.