【原创翻译】美国2015版《海洋战略》将发布牵制中国或首次写入大纲

发表于 2015-1-22 17:56

本帖最后由雨后阳光于 2015-1-23 08:56 编辑

　　美国2015版《海洋战略》将发布牵制中国或首次写入大纲

　　来源：美国外交政策网

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2015-1-22 17:55 上传

　　美国外交政策网21日发表詹姆斯•霍姆斯《如何统治公海同时牵制一个亚洲大国》的文章称，美国海军即将发布最新版《海洋战略》，修订后的《海洋战略》或首次涉及中国威胁。

　　在预测新版内容的同时,詹姆斯•霍姆斯对旧版内容进行了研究,称最近一版的《海洋战略》是在2007年发布的,里面没有提及中国。霍姆斯认为，2007版的《美国海洋战略》比较温和，其标题为“21世纪制海权合作战略”。更重要的是，之后一年美国经济遭遇大萧条，海军造船成本上升，加之“反介入”武器的扩散，美国开始面临双重挑战(预算削减和军事优势削弱)。

　　文章认为，“反介入”武器的扩散具体表现为岸基巡航导弹、弹道导弹以及其他武器的部署，这些均可对美国军舰巡航能力造成威胁。过去几年，有抱负的海上强国,不管大小，都已大量采购反介入武器——可削弱美国的海上战略能力。

　　与此同时,中国也开始在周边海域活动,危及美国在亚洲战略地位。亚丁湾反海盗行动以及马六甲海峡周边的活动就是例子。

　　霍姆斯还在文中指出：通常，军事战略都是以某个对手为假想敌制定的，所以，修订后的海洋策略极有可能提及某个国家。在2007年版的海洋发展战略发布5年后，奥巴马政府的重返亚洲政策出台。然而在美国海军2007年的海洋战略中，作为美国最强大的潜在对手,中国两字在文件中明显缺失。文章认为这绝对不是疏忽，只是因为当时没人认为中国会挑战美国及其盟友在亚洲的霸主地位。

　　文章进一步分析称，目前的中国正在发起魅力攻势，说服邻国接受并承认自己的新型霸主地位。与掠夺型的西方帝国不同,中国不会使用海军力量博取弱小国家的信任。毕竟,往昔的航海荣耀史奠定了中国与各国交好的睦邻安邻形像。而且北京坚方面坚称，会一直奉行这一原则。

　　然而霍姆斯认为，北京方面的这种说辞，似乎已成为中国走上强国之路的有利因素。这种“微笑外交”的真诚度仍有待验证-或许是北京用来阻止潜在对手的诡计。2007年之后,中国开始冒犯邻国，比如提出诸多领土要求，中国正在成为美国强大的敌人。

　　对于2015年的《海洋战略》会有多少次提到中国,会就北京的意图说点什么，以及修订后的区域战略重点将做何变更，文章做了以下分析：

　　按照“可靠战斗力”部署原则，之前的美国海洋战略排序为：西太平洋,印度洋和波斯湾，最后才提及做亚洲的海上霸主。然而,在这一战略顺序出现后不久,亲欧盟派就要求美国海军在地中海派驻航母战斗群，利比亚战事爆发，难民洪水般的从北非涌到欧洲，俄罗斯也开始在黑海活动等等。

　　据此，霍姆斯认为，作为世界最强的海洋大国，美国如果将自己的海洋力量分散在所有的七个大洋，自身力量就会被削弱。如果华盛顿继续大小事统管，就会面临资源管理危机，最终得不偿失。所以美国需要重新制定优先级。

　　文章最后指出，还有一点对美国非常不利：无论使用的措辞多么慎重，中国军方和海军官员常常会指责美国的海上战略动机。中国对美国2007年海洋战略的解读是，试图阻挠中国的崛起——即使文件中什么也没说。虽不知2015年的修订版是否会继续对中国保持沉默,但可以肯定地说，这一策略又会招致北京方面的指责。不过，根据霍姆斯个人观点，修订后的《海洋战略》将会使美国海军把注意力集中在亚洲地区。

源文：
　　http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01 ... utm_campaign=buffer

　　How to Rule the High Seas and Contain an Asian Country That Will Remain Nameless

　　U.S. naval forces are about to release a revised maritime strategy. The last one, in 2007, didn't mention China. Don't bet on that this time around.

　　BY JAMES HOLMES

　　JANUARY 21, 2015facebooktwittergoogle-plusredditemail

　　How to Rule the High Seas and Contain an Asian Country That Will Remain Nameless

　　Florentine philosopher-statesman Niccolò Machiavelli wrote that keeping pace with the times is the paramount challenge of statecraft. If so, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, known collectively as the sea services, have embroiled themselves in a truly Machiavellian enterprise.

　　After a series of fits and starts, sea-service chiefs are preparing to release a “refreshed,” or revised, version of their 2007 Maritime Strategy. Put simply, maritime strategy is the art of using available means — ships, aircraft, ground-pounders, armaments — to fulfill national purposes.

　　The updated strategy, accordingly, should provide clues to how the naval leadership sees the nautical world, and intends to cope with it amid finite and dwindling resources. Assessing that should indicate whether the services are fulfilling their Machiavellian duty to evolve in concert with the surrounding environment.

　　Soon to be released, the directive will also be worth investigating because the 2007 strategy was ahead of its time: It pivoted to Asia a full half-decade before the Obama administration shifted its own foreign-policy attentions eastward. The 2015 Maritime Strategy, then, may hint at the prospects for success of Obama’s signature policy.

　　Blandly titled “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” the 2007 Maritime Strategy appeared just months before the Great Recession.

　　Economic distress pinched shipbuilding budgets at a time when costs were spiraling upward and major segments of the fleet — tactical aircraft, nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines — were about to go out-of-date. As a result, the fleet stagnated, limiting the means available to execute the strategy.

　　This is doubly worrisome considering the proliferation of “anti-access” weaponry, shore-based cruise and ballistic missiles, and other armaments capable of targeting American ships cruising offshore.

　　Aspiring sea powers, great and small, have procured anti-access weapons in large numbers — precisely to deny the U.S. sea services the capacity to execute the Maritime Strategy.

　　Beijing, meanwhile, began swinging its weight around in the China seas, throwing the U.S. strategic position in Asia into jeopardy. Pirates took to raiding shipping in the Gulf of Aden and, to a lesser extent, near the Strait of Malacca. In short, demands on the sea services multiplied as resources faced mounting duress.

　　How to realign strategy with this brave new world? Enter the refreshed Cooperative Strategy. Its framers, a team drawn mostly from the Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard staffs, must answer questions about ends, ways, and means. Here are five big ones:

　　2. Will the refreshed strategy name names? Military strategies are typically tailored to opponents — not so in the 2007 strategy. China, America’s most formidable potential antagonist, was conspicuously missing from the document. An oversight? Not really.

　　In those days, no one knew whether China would challenge the United States and its allies for Asian primacy.

　　Beijing was prosecuting a charm offensive meant to persuade its neighbors that it was a new, beneficent sort of hegemon. Unlike predatory Western empires, it could be trusted not to use naval power to abuse weak nations.

　　After all, it had exercised self-restraint during bygone ages of nautical glory. And officialdom in Beijing insisted it was fated to do so again.

　　Beijing’s narrative was that this restraint constituted China’s inevitable path to great power. The message was quiet but clear: Fear not. Was it sincere about this “smiling diplomacy”?

　　Or was it a ruse to keep potential rivals from making common cause against China? In any case, thought Pentagon planners, why not give China a chance to live by its words? Accordingly, the 2007 strategy’s drafters refrained from language that might make an enemy of this rising power.

　　Since then, however, China has gone out of its way to affront its neighbors, for instance, by claiming waters allotted to them under the law of the sea. If Chinese diplomats once beamed benevolently at fellow Asians, they have taken to glowering at them in recent years — and acted accordingly.

　　Tracking how many times the 2015 update mentions China — and what it says about Beijing’s intentions — will help observers glimpse the future on these contested waters.

　　3. Will the revised strategy stand by the regional priorities set out in 2007? The earlier document directs the sea services to stage “credible combat power” in the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf for the foreseeable future — remaining, in effect, Asia’s seafaring hegemon.

　　4. Soon after the strategy appeared, however, partisans of other theaters started imploring naval leaders to modify their Asia-centric paradigm or junk it altogether.

　　5. Europhiles, for instance, beseeched the U.S. Navy to reinstall an aircraft-carrier strike group in the Mediterranean. Libya was aflame, they argued. Refugees were flooding from North Africa into Europe. Russia had started acting out in the Black Sea. And on and on.

　　It takes self-discipline to set priorities — and gumption to stick with them as commentators and policymakers begin clamoring to siphon off resources to manage the crisis du jour.It takes self-discipline to set priorities — and gumption to stick with them as commentators and policymakers begin clamoring to siphon off resources to manage the crisis du jour.

　　Whether the refreshed strategy will keep the sea services fixed on maritime Asia, consequently, remains an open question. And a crucial one.

　　The strongest force in the world can render itself weak by scattering assets throughout the seven seas. If Washington continues trying to manage all events — everywhere, and with overtaxed resources — it’s likely to accomplish little, anywhere.

　　4. Will the 2007 Maritime Strategy’s emphasis on building alliances and coalitions endure into 2015? Naval officials and officers have few options when commitments outstrip resources. They can go before lawmakers and plead for money to fund more assets, prevail on administration officials to scale back commitments, or coax foreign partners into pooling resources.

　　5. But it’s doubtful Congress will fund any serious naval buildup in these cash-strapped times. Indeed, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, America’s top uniformed naval officer, worries that a single initiative — replacing our 1980s-era nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines — will crowd out all other shipbuilding programs. Nor does Washington appear prepared to pare back its overseas diplomatic and military commitments.

　　6. That leaves coalition-building, which featured prominently in what was, after all, billed as a cooperative strategy to bolster maritime security. In the best of worlds, coastal states in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere will help police their offshore waters and skies, easing the burden on the American sea services. Accordingly, marshaling seagoing coalitions is crucial to supplementing U.S. naval power.

　　Parsing what the revised strategy says about naval diplomacy will give us insight into what may come. If the strategy subordinates custodianship over the commons to warfighting, it may also mute its advocacy of reaching out to foreign navies and coast guards.

　　5. What will it say about battle? Tucked among the 2007 Maritime Strategy’s passages extolling nautical cooperation are a few breathtakingly ambitious statements about U.S. combat prowess. “We will be able to impose local sea control wherever necessary,” declare the service chiefs, “ideally in concert with friends and allies, but by ourselves if we must.” What this means, in effect: The sea services reserve the right — and will preserve the capacity — to seize control of any navigable body of water on the earth’s surface if their political masters so direct.

　　Zounds!

　　Local, unilateral sea command across the globe may have been a realistic goal in 2007. Today, it sounds like bravado — if not outright hubris. Winning sea command from local opponents is no longer that easy, if indeed it ever was. A triumphal afterglow tinges memories of the Cold War, as though the Soviet Navy was a pushover. But American maritime supremacy was never put to the test of combat off Soviet coastlines, where submarines, land-based bombers, and other hardware waited to pounce on U.S. Navy task forces. No one knows how a seaborne clash would have unfolded, or how a similar high-seas struggle would unfold today. How the 2015 strategy’s drafters describe the dangers posed by anti-access measures — again, the proliferation of deadly anti-ship weaponry to great and minor coastal states alike — will indicate much about how the sea services approach their warfighting duties in the coming years.

　　The good news is that sea-service potentates appear to take the access-denial challenge seriously. They are grooming a new generation of maritime strategists, bolstering the human factor in naval warfare. On the operational and material sides, they’re exploring concepts for operating and thriving in fiercely contested settings. In all likelihood, then, the refreshed strategy will adopt a more sober tone than its predecessor took toward such matters. The attitude thus conveyed will ripple throughout the ranks, engendering new humility about the limits of American sea power. That’s all to the good.

　　What’s less good is that Chinese military and naval officials will impute the worst motives to any Maritime Strategy, no matter how circumspectly worded. They interpreted the 2007 strategy as a scheme for containing and thwarting China’s rise — even though it said nothing about China.

　　It’s doubtful the 2015 update will remain silent about China — and thus safe to say the strategy will set Beijing to caterwauling. Again.

发表于 2015-1-22 17:59

怎么不围堵了？。。。。。

发表于 2015-1-22 18:02

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【原创翻译】美国2015版《海洋战略》将发布 牵制中国或首次写入大纲

【原创翻译】美国2015版《海洋战略》将发布牵制中国或首次写入大纲