http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/w ... s-in-a-naval-clash/
来自外交官网的文章,
未来亚太海上力量 中日美印谁主沉浮
安吉特·潘达
2014年8月6日
之前, 外交官网的海军外交官詹姆斯•霍姆斯曾在国家利益网评估了-中美爆发战争时中国获胜的机会。
霍姆斯的分析是以1894年中日甲午战争为基础的, 他指出：光是分析双方(中美)的硬件设施便可得知这场(可能爆发的)战争的结果。
但是，仅仅参考《简氏战舰大全》来预测海军冲突胜利者的非理性思维-是在将人类聪明才智、人性的不可靠以及战争的变幻莫测特征排除在外。
更糟糕的是, 这样做排除了政治因素。比如，在1894 - 1895年，日本要想实现其战胜中国的目标，其实只需一场小规模的战役(暗指清朝政府无能，日本只需与政治攻势稍加配合)。
所以，没有必要推翻清朝政权, 占领中国,甚至征服整个清朝海军。
同样, 如果要达到最现实的目标，今天的中国也不需要完全击败美军。
中国人民解放军很快就能获得足以让北京达成目标的实力。 其实, 中国很可能已经具备了这种能力。
现在，美国和中国之间的战略竞争日益增多，如果有兴趣对澳大利亚在亚太地区的地位加以探讨, 我认为澳洲战略政策研究所的战略家休·怀特和彼得·詹宁斯的辩论稿很值得一读;该书讨论了澳大利亚-在什么程度上以及是否必须在美国和中国之间作出选择。
辩论中，詹宁斯反驳了怀特-澳大利亚不一定非要在“美国和中国之间做出选择”的论点。
如果你错过了这一辩论, 也可以看看日本2014年发布的国防白皮书, 书中所述对中国的态度不是太好。
如果你不想通读这份505页的报告，我们的克林特·理查兹为你研究了一下东京此份报告的细节。
在接受RealClearDefense采访时，战略与国际研究中心的大卫·M·兰普顿探讨了中美关系的现状, 他认为双方都在逐渐向强制外交靠拢。
兰普顿指出, 亚洲问题不仅仅是中国的民族主义, 而是席卷整个亚洲“互相矛盾的、自信的民族主义风气”。
这种环境下, “在反对中国的强硬民族主义时，美国也不能纵容其他国家享有此种自由，华盛顿要小心了。”
彭博社(Bloomberg)很好地概述了中国空军当下的状态, 称：中国空军在中国军事战略中正在发挥着越来越多的作用。
罗伯特·法利和我关注了中国空中力量在中国亚太战略中越来越重要的作用。
最后,外交政策网的Ritika Katyal分析了为什么印度的“海洋”野心很值得关注，在分析的过程中, Ritika Katyal罗列了印度广泛的海上战略使命。
事实上, 印度如果想成为印度洋战略后院的多边海上领袖, 它将不得不拥有一支强大的海军。
原文：
Why China Might Beat the US in a Naval Clash
Plus, Australia’s position in the Asia-Pacific, the Chinese air force, and more.
By Ankit Panda
August 06, 2014
Over at The National Interest, our very own Naval Diplomat, James Holmes, assesses China’s chances in a war with America.
Holmes frames his analysis using the 1894-1894 Sino-Japanese War, noting that assessing hardware alone will tell us little about the outcome of a potential war:
So to rifle through the pages of Jane’s Fighting Ships, project the victor in a naval clash, and pronounce other possibilities irrational is to rule out human ingenuity, human fallibility, and the vagaries of war.
Worse, it rules out politics. Japan only needed a small-scale triumph over imperial China to fulfill its aims in 1894-1895.
It saw no need to overthrow the Qing regime, occupy China, or even vanquish the entire Qing navy. Today, likewise, China need not utterly defeat American arms to achieve modest goals.
Capability sufficient to Beijing’s purposes may soon fall within the PLA’s grasp. Heck, it may already be within reach.
If you’re interested in Australia’s position in the Asia-Pacific amid a growing strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, it’s worth reading the debate over at the ASPI Strategist between Hugh White and Peter Jennings on whether and to what degree Australia must choose between the U.S. and China.
Jennings rebuts White’s claim that Australia need not necessarily “make a choice between America and China.”
If you missed it, Japan’s 2014 defense white paper is out and it isn’t too nice to China.
Our own Clint Richards takes a look at the specifics over at the Tokyo Report, in case you don’t feel like treading through the 505-page report.
Over at RealClearDefense, CSIS Pac Net’s David M. Lampton takes a look at the state of U.S.-China relations, arguing that both sides are slowly slipping towards coercive diplomacy.
Lampton notes that Asia’s problem is not just Chinese nationalism, but “conflicting, assertive nationalisms” (in the plural) throughout Asia.
In this environment, “Washington needs to be careful that in opposing the assertive nationalism of China we are not giving free rein to others.”
Bloomberg has a good overview of the state of the Chinese air force, which is increasingly playing a greater role in China’s military strategy.
Both Robert Farley and I looked at the evolving role of air power in China’s Asia-Pacific strategy here on Flashpoints recently.
Finally, over at Foreign Policy, Ritika Katyal takes a look at “Why India’s ‘Blue Water’ Ambitions Matter,” and in the process catalogues India’s broad maritime strategic imperatives.
Indeed, for India to become a multilateral maritime leader in the Indian Ocean, its strategic backyard, it will have to field a robust navy.
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发表于 2014-8-7 17:23
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