【原创翻译】中美未来战场在南海 其余问题都不算事

　http://nationalinterest.org/blog ... igger-problem-10890

    　来自美国国家利益网的文章

　　中美未来战场在南海 其余问题都不算事

　　哈利·J·卡扎尼斯

　　2014年7月16日

　　与伊拉克、叙利亚或正在进行的乌克兰危机相比，考虑到未来国际关系、强权政治或贸易投资的流动趋势, 没有什么问题会比中美关系更重要。

　　考虑一下风险因素—比如5500亿美元的双边贸易关系、北京与多个美国盟友的领土争端和反诉讼(如果事情失控，就有可能引发战争)以及中国与北边邻居日益暧昧的关系：没有什么会比这些问题更紧迫。

　　大体的解决方案我们也知道: 在不颠覆现状或引发冲突的前提下，找到一条可以尊重北京在亚太和印度-太平洋地区日益增长利益需求的道路。

　　美国新安全中心的两位专家在最近的一次华盛顿邮报专栏中解释道:

　　“目前的解决办法是基于这样的考量：中国融入世界主流经济和安全秩序-不仅符合中国的利益,也有利于美国和整个世界;

　　(如此)从理论上来讲, 中国在国际体系中的影响力比重也会增加;

　　从互惠互利的角度看,这种做法是有助于稳定并维护现有规则和规范的：即使中国具备了可以进一步违反规则的能力，航海自由和和平解决争端仍旧可以发挥作用;

　　最终，中国会成为-前副国务卿罗伯特•佐立克所述的：一个“负责任的利益相关者”。

　　但不幸的是, 考虑到中国的崛起因素，美国的首选战略已经派不上用场了。这两位专家又指出:

　　“在经历几十年的两位数经济增长后, 受全球金融危机的影响-中国的行为出现了显著的转折;

　　中国有很多人预期：美国将走向衰落, 融合了中国日益增长的民族主义和财富的这种必胜信念-使得中国外交政策更为自信。”

　　在南海,尽管国际社会收到了一个好消息—中国结束了其在越南海岸的钻井作业—但北京对华盛顿的立场还是很清楚的, 根据路透社的一篇报道:“在美国表示-希望各国停止加剧紧张局势之后，中国于本周二告诉美国-远离南海纠纷,让该地区国家自己解决问题。”

　　同南海周边的其他国家一样，中国也会利用诉讼法来处理争端。所以-要想对抗中国，各国需要在征服世界舆论上下功夫, 用羞辱策略让舆论站在自己一边, 并使中国为此付出代价。

　　至于华盛顿，则可在法律框架内支持那些提起领土诉讼-寻求危机解决方案的国家。

　　如果北京方面拒绝参与这个过程(正如他们之前对菲律宾的态度)或者多次拒绝参加争议解决法案,假以时日-中国的斗志就会有所消退。

　　虽然上面的策略显然并不完美, 但在增加中国挑衅行为的成本问题上，它确实给美国及其亚洲盟友创造了(至少)一套工具。

　　这样做或许可以为北京的领土要求降温, 但阻碍美国及其盟友与中国整体关系的仍有很多问题。

　　在许多方面, 美国和整个亚洲面临的挑战由来已久:一个崛起的大国必定会有改变国际体系的需求——这是诉诸法院或羞辱策略都不可能解决的长期性问题。

　　原文：

　　The South China Sea Crisis: Part of a Much Bigger Problem

　　Harry J. Kazianis

　　July 16, 2014

　　Forget the crisis in Iraq, Syria, or the ongoing situation in Ukraine. While those issues and parts of the world are clearly important, when we think about the future of international relations, power politics, or the flows of trade investment there is no issue of more importance than the future trends of Sino-U.S. relations.

　　Considering the stakes--like a $550 Billion bilateral trade relationship, the amount of territorial claims and counterclaims Beijing has with multiple U.S. allies (who we would have to go to war for if things got out of control), as well as China’s growing flirtations with a certain neighbor to the north--nothing else really comes close.

　　The solution by and large is also known: finding a way to respect a rising Beijing’s growing interests in the Asia-Pacific and much wider Indo-Pacific without upending the status-quo or sparking a conflict no one wants.

　　The preferred American option, neatly summarized by Michèle Flournoy and Ely Ratner for the Center for New American Security, or CNAS, was to imesh China into the international system.

　　As they explain in a recent Washington Post op-ed:

　　“The current approach has been premised on the idea that China’s integration into the prevailing economic and security order not only is in China’s interest but also benefits the United States and the whole world.

　　As a result of this embrace, the theory goes, China’s stake in the international system would increase over time.

　　By virtue of self-interest, it would come to see the benefits of contributing to stability and upholding existing rules and norms, such as freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of disputes, even as it became more capable of violating them.

　　This would eventually lead China to emerge as, to use former deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick’s indelible phrase, a “responsible stakeholder.”

　　Unfortunately, America’s preferred strategy when it comes to the rise of China is finished.

　　As the CNAS duo points out:

　　“Following decades of double-digit economic growth, China’s behavior took a notable turn in the wake of the global financial crisis.

　　Many in Beijing anticipated a rapid U.S. decline, and this triumphalism fused with growing nationalism and wealth to generate a more assertive Chinese foreign policy.”

　　In the South China Sea, while the international community received a bit of good news--that China was ending drilling operations off the coast of Vietnam--Beijing made its position to Washington very clear, according to a report by Reuters: “China told the United States on Tuesday to stay out of disputes over the South China Sea and leave countries in the region to resolve problems themselves, after Washington said it wanted a freeze on stoking tension.”

　　Claimants in the South China Sea could use lawsuits in the same way. They need to fight China’s claims in the court of public opinion, using a shaming strategy to get opinion on their side--to enact some measure of costs for China’s actions.

　　Washington could then support those who have filed the claims to seek a solution to the crisis through legal frameworks.

　　If Beijing declines to participate in the process, as they have already in the case of the Philippines, or declining multiple times with possible additional filed claims, this would set Beijing up to lose the perception battle.

　　While the above strategy is clearly imperfect, it does give the United States and its allies in Asia at least one set of tools to increase the costs of China’s provocative actions.

　　Even if this was to work and Beijing backed off its claims, America along with its allies would still have many more issues with China hampering overall ties.

　　In many respects, the challenge America faces along with Asia as a whole is as old as history itself: the concept of a rising power bent on modifying the international system for its own wants and needs--a long term problem no court or shaming strategy can fix.

歪脖看来真的不咋地。。。。白长个大个子。。。