2014年8月19日，美国海军一架P-8A海上侦察机，在海南岛以东约220海里，中国专属经济区上空飞行，解放军海军航空兵得知后，立即驾驶J-11战机前往拦截。根据五角大楼发言人海军少将约翰·柯比称，“战机飞得很近，非常危险……充满攻击性，非常不专业。…”三次不同情形，J-11从美国飞机机腹直接穿过，其中一次，两机相距只有50-100英尺……
中国战机以90度角擦过P-8A鼻端，机腹挂载武器一览无余。中国飞行员做此动作时，是看不到P-8A的，这进一步增加了撞机危险…然后中国飞行员在P-8A底下及旁边飞行，翼尖相距仅20英尺，之后，在稳定战机前，他环绕P-8A 作了一个拱桶动作，相距仅45英尺。此次事件虽没未发生碰撞或机组人员死亡，但这让人想起另一起严重事故，2001年4月，美国海军EP-3与中国歼-8战机发生碰撞，中国飞行员丧生。
虽然最近事故未造成伤亡，但此事件的严重性促使美国政府，在2014年11月亚太经合组织峰会上，就提高美中军事单位之间相互协作与中方交换了意见。经过几轮谈判后，2014年11月初，美、中国防部签署了两项谅解备忘录，旨在确保两国之间军事关系的稳定。
谅解备忘录提到，第一，海上和空中相遇的安全行为准则，美国希望中国完全遵守基于国际海洋秩序的规则。第二，重大军事活动的通知，明确建立信任机制，推进“两军关系新模式…”，敦促中国增加透明度。备忘录旨在构建积极沟通机制，以减少误解，避免发生误判。
谅解备忘录的“规则”
备忘录“行为准则”的目的是创建一个共同、共享的理解、接受机制，确保海上安全。此准则作为一个“降低风险”的机制，加强了地区的和平与稳定。关于降低风险，谅解备忘录含蓄地承认中美在东海时常存在争议与竞争关系。在此情形下，管理军事冲突中固有的风险，美国一直致力于促使中国适应海上行为准则，2001年EP-3事件后，从乔治•布什政府到奥巴马政府都一直在坚持。中国同意谅解备忘录，是积极推进这一进展的有力证据。
为实现降低风险目标，谅解备忘录强化了现有海上和空中的“交通规则”，中美就此达成协议。这包括国际海事组织确保海上航行安全的碰撞法规(COLREGS)；规定空中安全航行的芝加哥公约；最近达成的海上意外相遇准则(CUES)。这个谅解备忘录并没有达成新的准则，美国认为其海军军事行动没有变化，海军舰艇或军用机驾驶舱的操作程序也没改变。
美国海军已经按照安全规则操作，本谅解备忘录强化了解放军部队专业行为的重要性。美国军事指挥官希望解放军船只、飞机在美国船、机附近安全操作，认为这是别人应有的权利和自由，也符合现有国际规则和法律。
提到“适当操作”的普遍性，备忘录认为“交通规则”在地理上是中立的，适用于海洋及其空域。事实上，美中最频繁的接触是在阿拉伯海湾，而非东亚，但普遍性也意味着它适用于所有海上区域。因此，无论美中船只在领海、专属经济区或在公海上，即使双方可能没有基于国际法的相同政策，备忘录还是增加了船只、飞机安全的概率。
美中双方需要谅解备忘录凸显了这样一个事实，在外国专属经济区进行军事活动，两国有不同的政策，尽管这一政策分歧可能在缩小。与国际法相违背的中国政策，基于其国内法律，认为在中国专属经济区海上和空中的外国情报收集或军事演习，未经中国同意是非法的。美军频繁执行如此活动，当然被中国当做攻击目标，才导致2009年美海军“无瑕”号事件与2014年考本斯号事件。
具有讽刺意味的是，解放军海军也曾分别于2013年、2014年在美国专属经济区夏威夷、关岛活动，这些“证据”表明，中国的立场可能会改变。那次解放军得到美军很安全、专业的回应，证明国家利益的维护无需攻击性行为表达。如果这个谅解备忘录能减少甚至消除中国的危险行为，它将是美中军事关系的一个重要里程碑。
备忘录“规则”的另外一个好处是，它也可能有利于中国的邻居。中国公开承认，其他国家也应遵守国际准则，中国在与别国的交互行动中，是遵守这些准则的。因此，备忘录“交通规则”不仅是中美标准，而是设置了一个明确的国际标准。
尽管这个谅解备忘录带来了积极进展，但仍然存在一些问题。例如，中国经常在其专属经济区宣布“演习区域”或“内在防御领域”，并声称演习期间完全关闭该地区的国际航行。这种做法违反了国际法。国际法规定，在有潜在危险的演习区，该国要宣布“警告区域”，但是没有权利强制关闭国际航道。中国是否会和其他国家一样，改变其演习要求，承认在军演期间，参与单位有责任充分考虑其他船只的航行权利?
第二个问题明显来自谅解备忘录的构成本身。显然，在亚太经合组织峰会之前的谈判时间短促。该谅解备忘录承诺中美在2015年达成空中协议，但这可能吗?由于一点点的误差就会带来非常严重的后果，空中接触的安全性也许是美中军事交流中最重要的一个议题。确实，2001年，在与美国海军EP-3相撞后 ，中国飞行员王伟牺牲。美军监视侦察机继续进入中国东海和南海的专属经济区上空，空中接触的危险仍然明显地存在。
最后，美中海军历史上有很长一段时间通过信息通讯转接（MMCA）接触。该谅解备忘录强化了MMCA的中心地位，通过提供一个反馈机制，讨论任何不服从行为的申诉。但是谅解备忘录或MMCA过程，都没有执行机制。冒犯的人会被追究责任吗?受损一方能得到法律维护吗?这些问题仍需要厘清。然而，在一定程度上，备忘录“准则”强化了美中之间基于海上规则的关系，这是一个重大、积极的进展。只有中国完全接受国际规则和法律，才能确保军事相遇的安全。
备忘录“通知”
备忘录的第二点是，同意每一方的“重大军事活动”须通知高层。这反映了，随着中国的军事扩张，增加了东亚的战略不稳定。谅解备忘录表明双方在军事关系中存在的不平衡，美国通知和邀请的频率大大超过其中国同行。通过管理战术部队的行为，备忘录“交通规则”重点是避免危机，而通过增加透明度，备忘录“通知”高级军事和文职领导人，来管理战略风险。因此，谅解备忘录“准则”，有效地增加了东亚地区的稳定性。
围绕这个“通知”要求，大多数讨论侧重于重大演习时双方提前的告知。然而，协议的具体条款，更加宽泛。“活动”这一术语本身含有更多信息，不仅仅只是简单的演习，双方有明确义务来交换“主要官方出版物和报告”以及关于“调整各自国防政策和战略”的信息。这些歧义部分也写进备忘录里，分别是“重大安全政策和战略发展的通知”和“军事演习和活动的观察”。然而，这些条款还没有完全厘清，当双方开始实施该备忘录条款时，还留下许多有待解决。
备忘录源于，2013年6月在安纳伯格庄园，习近平主席向奥巴马总统建议，双方寻找方法，建立互信机制，改善东亚及两大强国之间的军事氛围。随后在亚太峰会上，两国领导人宣布了这一备忘录，尽管P-8A事件后，双方军事关系冷若冰霜，但这仍然反映了双方都希望落实先前承诺。如前所述，正是这一事件，促使双方谈判，达成两点备忘录。但事实上，这一事件发生距亚太峰会不到三个月，想必是有政治压力促使双方迅速采取行动，重塑美中军事关系。
这些备忘录对美国海军意味着什么呢?观察认为，美国海军、或者其他作战部队的任何日常操作或活动都无需改变。但还是存在潜在影响。例如，随着政府和军事领导人的实践，这些备忘录将具有意义。随着实践积累，备忘录“通知”范围内的活动解释应该会逐渐清晰条理。注意明确区分演习与常规活动，海军“活动”事先通知中国，应狭义理解为，保持符合该谅解备忘录的要求即可，同时在海军操作空间上，要充分保护美国利益，这一点才至关重要。
事实上，一些中国官员似乎觉得，以备忘录为契机，结合美国深化军事合作关系，而美国也有足够的政治意愿来支持这一点。在最近的一次会议上，一位中国学者说，随着党派政治升温，2014年的国会选举结果表明，2016年的总统大选时，中美关系可能会下滑。这个学者认为，这些备忘录的谈判中，中国政府的目标是稳定与美国的军事互动框架协议。根据这一观点，备忘录表明中国政府在防备美国潜在的政策转变所带来的风险。尽管这可能是一个过度悲观的观点，备忘录强调了一个事实，即中美很难拥有持久的利益，有时甚至是不可调和的。
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下一步
由于美中战略利益不同，在短期内可以实现什么应适度期望。关于备忘录，中国内部的政治态度是什么?辖区军事单位会如何选择，特别是当民族主义高涨?解放军会后退、裹足不前吗?如果是这样，这些备忘录应该跟进，伴随着美国改善行为的期望或失败——毕竟这些“实施成本”（帕特里克·克罗宁提出）是必要的。与此同时，美国需要积极安抚东亚的盟友、伙伴和朋友，毕竟，我们试图与中国建立良好关系，不能以牺牲他们的利益为代价。如果按着备忘录这种形式在实践中操作，美国的战略利益将不会加强，而是被严重削弱。
总之，在海上让中国习惯于遵守规则，以及演习与意图的提前沟通，这些尝试是积极的一步，但大国之间的关系并不那么容易。领导人清醒地知道，尽管这些备忘录有助于减少海上危机的风险，但不能消除风险，因为危机背后深层次的分歧利益没有消除。即使相互理解，对强国的尊重是无法被替代的。
作为强国，双方有理由继续使用战术部队，果断行动来实现重要的国家目标，美国在中国专属经济区的侦察行动，中国使用全方位的海上力量，增加东海、南海岛屿和海域的控制，就是两个显著的例子。因此，在未来几十年，美国海军在亚洲的强大存在，加上盟友、合作伙伴和朋友的支持，仍然是可靠的维持地区稳定的力量，什么基于遵守规则或改善关系的政治协议，都是扯淡。
彼得·A·达顿,美国海军军事学院中国海事研究所教授。也是纽约大学法学副教授，亚美法学研究所研究员。研究主要集中在东亚海上争端及其全球影响。
原文链接：
http://nationalinterest.org/feat ... hina-disaster-12154
原文：
MOUs: The Secret Sauce to Avoiding a U.S.-China Disaster?
The American and Chinese militaries have had some close calls and fatal encounters at sea and in the skies. The newly signed MOUs could help prevent future collisions.
Peter A. Dutton
January 30, 2015
On August 19, 2014, a U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft was flying above the Chinese exclusive economic zone (EEZ) about 220 nautical miles east of Hainan Island in the South China Sea when a People's Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF) J-11 fighter intercepted it. The encounter, according to Pentagon spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby, was "very close, very dangerous ... pretty aggressive and very unprofessional. … On three different occasions, the Chinese J-11 crossed directly under the U.S. aircraft, with one pass having only 50-100 feet separation between the two aircraft ...
The Chinese jet also passed the nose of the P-8 at 90 degrees with its belly toward the P-8 to show its weapons load-out. In doing so the [Chinese] pilot was unable to see the P-8, further increasing the potential for a collision. … The Chinese pilot then flew directly under and alongside the P-8, bringing their wingtips within 20 feet, and then, before he stabilized his fighter, he conducted a roll over the P-8, passing within 45 feet." The incident ended without a collision or the death of aircrew from either side, but it invoked memories of another serious incident that did not end as well—theApril 2001 collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 and a Chinese F-8 in which the Chinese pilot perished.
Although the most recent encounter ended without casualty, the seriousness of the P-8 Incident energized the U.S. government ahead of the November 2014 APEC Summit to get some results in improving the nature of the interactions between American and Chinese military units. After several rounds of negotiations in both Beijing and Washington, in early November 2014, the U.S. Department of Defense and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense signed two Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) designed to enhance the stability of the military relationship between the two countries.
The first, an MOU concerning “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” speaks to the American desire to fully integrate China into the rules-based international maritime order. The second, an MOU on “Notification of Major Military Activities” is explicitly a confidence-building mechanism to advance a “new model … of military-to-military relations” and to promote increased Chinese transparency. The Notification MOU seeks to build and institutionalize habits of positive communication in order to reduce the risk of misunderstanding and to avoid miscalculation.
The “Rules” MOU
The goal of the “rules of behavior” MOU is to create a common and shared understanding and acceptance of the rules sets that ensure safe operations at sea as a “risk reduction” mechanism to “strengthen regional peace and stability.” By focusing on risk reduction, the MOU implicitly acknowledges the sometimes contentious and competitive nature of U.S.- China relations in the East Asian seas. To manage the risk inherent in military encounters in this type of environment, Americans have long worked to bring China into the rules-based maritime order—it was the consistent focus of the George W. Bush administration after the 2001 EP-3 Incident and this objective has been persistently pursued by the Obama administration. That the Chinese agreed to this MOU is positive evidence of progress toward this goal.
To accomplish the risk-reduction objectives, the MOU reinforces existing “rules of the road” at sea and in the air as provided in agreements to which both China and the United States are already parties. This includes the International Maritime Organization’s Collision Regulations (COLREGS) for safe navigation at sea, the Chicago Convention on rules for safety of navigation in the air and the recently-agreed-upon Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). Since no new rule sets are created by this MOU, no change in American naval and military operations or procedures is required on the bridge of any U.S. Navy ship or in the cockpit of any U.S. military aircraft.
American naval and military units already operate in accordance with the rules for safety and this MOU reinforces the importance for professional behavior by the forces of the PLA as well. American military commanders will now be looking for PLA ships and aircraft to consistently operate safely in the vicinity of American units—known in legal terms as the exercise of due regard for the rights and freedoms of others—as is required by existing international rules and laws.
Reflecting the universality of the “due regard” requirement for conducting operations, the “rules of the road” MOU is geographically neutral—it applies everywhere in and above the ocean. Indeed, the most frequent contacts between U.S. and Chinese units are actually in the Arabian Gulf, not in East Asia. But universality also means it applies in all maritime zones. Accordingly, whether U.S. and Chinese vessels meet in a territorial sea, an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas, this MOU increases the likelihood that the vessels or aircraft will interact safely, even when the two sides may not have the same policy about the underlying international law that applies.
That the United States and China need this MOU highlights the fact that the two countries still have different policies concerning the right to undertake military activities in a foreign EEZ, although that policy gap may be closing. China’s policy, which is contrary to international law, is based on its domestic laws, which assert that foreign intelligence-gathering operations or military exercises in and above China’s EEZ are unlawful without Chinese consent. American military units performing such operations have been the frequent targets of aggressive Chinese maneuvering—resulting in the USNS Impeccable Incident in 2009 and the USS Cowpens and a U.S. Navy P-8 incident in 2014.
Ironically, similar PLA naval operations in the American EEZ around Hawaii and Guam in 2013 and 2014 provided some early evidence that China’s stance on such operations may be changing. The Chinese operations were met with very safe and professional American responses, demonstrating that national interests can be expressed without aggressive behavior. If this MOU reduces or even eliminates dangerous Chinese behaviors, it will prove to be a major milestone in U.S.-PRC military relations.
One additional benefit of the “rules” MOU is worth highlighting—it may also benefit China’s beleaguered neighbors. China’s public acknowledgement of international standards of behavior should allow other countries to observe them and to hold China accountable for observing them in their mutual interactions. Accordingly, the “rules of the road” MOU sets a clear international standard, not just a U.S.-China standard.
Despite the positive developments brought about by this MOU, some questions remain. For instance, China routinely declares “exercise areas” or “inner defense areas” in its EEZ and purports to entirely close the areas to international navigation during the period of the exercises. When done in its EEZ, this practice is contrary to international law, which allows states to announce “warning areas” during potentially dangerous exercises, but gives no right to enforce closure of such areas to international navigation. Will the Chinese change their exercise claims and, like other countries, accept that during such exercises, the participating units have the burden to give due regard to other ships practicing their right to navigation?
A second issue is apparent from the structure of the MOU itself. Apparently, negotiating time before the APEC Summit ran short before an annex on aerial navigation could be completed. The MOU commits China and the United States to complete an air annex in 2015, but will this happen? The safety of aerial contacts is perhaps the single most important issue in U.S.-China military interactions, since the margin for error is slight and the consequences of unsafe interactions can be so severe. Indeed, Chinese pilot Wang Wei died in the 2001 mid-air collision with a U.S. Navy EP-3. With American surveillance and reconnaissance flights continuing in the airspace above China’s EEZ in the East and South China Seas, the dangers of unsafe aerial contacts remain clear and present.
Finally, the U.S. and Chinese navies have a long history of engagement through the MMCA process. The MOU reinforces the centrality of the MMCA process by providing a feedback mechanism to discuss allegations of any nonconforming behavior. But there is no enforcement mechanism built into either the MOU or the MMCA process. Will an offending individual be held accountable? Will the results of disciplinary processes be shared with the aggrieved side to complete the cycle of accountability? These are just some of the questions that will need to be clarified over time. However, to the extent that the “rules” MOU reinforces a rules-based relationship between the United States and China at sea, it is a major positive development. The Chinese movement in the direction of full acceptance of international rules and laws can only enhance the safety of military encounters.
The Notification MOU
The second MOU agrees to high-level notification of each side’s “major military activities.” It reflects the increasing sense of strategic instability in East Asia, as China’s military expands. The MOU advances and addresses the existing imbalance in the military-to-military relationship in which American notifications and invitations substantially exceed those of their Chinese counterparts. While the “rules of the road” MOU is focused on avoiding crises by managing the behavior of tactical forces, the “notification” MOU places its burdens on senior military and civilian leaders to manage strategic risk through increased transparency. Thus, alongside the “rules” MOU, it should effectively contribute to increased regional stability in East Asia.
Most discussion surrounding this notification requirement focuses on country-to-country advance reporting of major exercises. The specific terms of the agreement, however, are much broader. The term “activities” itself inherently captures much more than simply exercises, and the two sides undertook explicit obligations to exchange information related to “major official publications and statements” and regarding “adjustment of respective national defense policies and strategy.” These ambiguities are partly addressed in the annexes, which address “notification of major security policy and strategy developments” and “observation of military exercises and activities.” However, even these terms are not fully clarified in the document, leaving much to be addressed as each side begins to put the MOU’s terms into practice.
The genesis of the MOUs was a suggestion by President Xi Jinping to President Obama in June 2013 at Sunnylands that the two sides find ways to develop confidence-building measures to improve the military climate in East Asia and between the two powerful countries. The announcement of the MOUs at the two leaders’ next meeting at the APEC Summit, therefore, reflects a desire to demonstrate progress on earlier commitments, despite a military relationship that has been described as “rocky” in the wake of the P-8 Incident. As has been noted, it was this incident that prompted the talks to negotiate the two MOUs, but the fact that the incident occurred less than three months before the APEC Summit suggests there may have been political pressure to act quickly to recast the U.S.-China military relationship.
What are the implications of these MOUs for the U.S. Navy? It has been observed already that neither MOU seems to require any change in the day-to-day operations or activities of the U.S. Navy or any other operational military units. But there are potential implications nonetheless. For instance, these MOUs will be given life and meaning through the practice of government and military leaders. As practice accumulates, the interpretation of the activities that fall within the Notification MOU’s scope should be carefully structured. A clear distinction should be made between exercise activities and operational activities. Prior notification to China of the Navy’s “activities” should be kept to the narrowest definition that meets the requirements of the MOU, while also fully protecting the vital American interests in the Navy’s operational latitude.
Indeed, some Chinese officials appear to see the MOUs as an opportunity to bind the United States into a cooperative military relationship, while sufficient political will exists on this side of the Pacific to support one. On the sidelines of a recent conference, one Chinese academic stated that as a result of the 2014 Congressional elections, the U.S.-Chinese relationship could be on a downward slide into the 2016 presidential election, as partisan politics heat up. In this scholar’s view, the Chinese government’s objective in negotiating these MOUs was to bind the United States to a stable framework for military interactions. According to this view, the MOUs represent a hedge for the Chinese government against a potential American policy shift in a more assertive direction. While this is perhaps an unduly pessimistic view of the MOUs, it highlights the fact that China and the United States have enduring interests that are difficult, perhaps even impossible, to reconcile.
Next Steps
Because the United States and China have such different strategic interests, modest expectations should be set for what can be achieved in the short term. What will be the internal political dynamic in China regarding these MOUs? How will individual military units choose to behave, especially when nationalism is running high? Will there be PLA pushback and foot dragging? If so, these MOUs will need to be followed up with concrete American expectations of improved behavior or consequences for its failure—“impose[d] costs” as Patrick Cronin puts it. In the meantime, the United States will need to actively reassure our allies, partners and friends in East Asia that our attempts to build confidence into our relationship with China will not come at the expense of their interests. If that impression forms as these MOUs are interpreted in practice, American strategic interests will have been seriously weakened, rather than strengthened, as the MOUs intend.
In conclusion, the policy of attempting to build Chinese habits of adherence to rules of interaction at sea and communication about exercises and intentions is a positive step. But relations between powerful states are not so easily ordered. Sober-minded leaders will observe that while these MOUs help reduce the risk of crisis at sea, they will not eliminate it, because they do not eliminate the divergent security interests that are at the root of the crises. And even as they improve understanding, such insight is no replacement for respect for power.
As powerful states, both sides will continue to have reasons to use tactical units assertively to achieve important national objectives—the U.S. reconnaissance operations in China’s EEZ and China’s use of full-spectrum maritime power to increase its control over its claimed islands and waters in the East and South China Seas are two prominent examples. For this reason, the powerful presence of the U.S. Navy in Asia, supported by strengthened allies, partners and friends, remains a surer guarantor or regional stability in the coming decades than political agreements based either on adherence to rules or improved relationships.
Peter A. Dutton is Professor and Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. He is also Adjunct Professor of Law at New York University and a Distinguished Fellow in the U.S.-Asia Law Institute there. His research focuses on the maritime disputes in East Asia and the regional and global implications of them.
Image: Flickr/Official U.S. Navy/CC by 2.0
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