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美国的战略团体正在讨论如何正确应对A2/AD（反介入/反区域封锁）威胁以及中国日益增长的军事实力，他们的争论证明，空海一体战（ASB）是一种成功的战略思想，而且会在未来战场扮演至关重要的角色。
上周，美国国防部宣布，五角大楼的“空海一体战”概念将被重新定义：纳入了更加广泛的“全球公域介入与机动联合概念（或JAM-GC）”。美国一些私营新闻媒体的报道用不同的动词来描述所空海一体战的此次遭遇，其中，第一篇文章的标题是最直言不讳的。
这篇报道的标题为“国防部撤销空海一体战概念”，这种描述也许是最正确的解读。虽然只是一次名称的改变，但将“空海一体战”并入高度官僚化的联合概念，可能会扼杀美军的创新精神，削弱人们对空海作战思想的重视。
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如果空海一体战确实已被撤销，人们不免会反思一下ASB短暂的一生:这种概念取得了哪些成效，它的下个目标是什么，以及美军从中学到了什么。不过，现在做悼词可能为时过早。
美国战略团体在讨论和辩论中认为，被放弃的空海战概念似乎可以继续发展并使美军受益。如果有一件事是多数观察人士可以达成一致意见的，那就是这一“概念”一直鲜为人知，所以很难对空海一体战作出高度评价。但大多数版本的报道认为，应对反介入/区域封锁挑战，以及中国快速发展和增强的反介入/区域封锁能力是空海战关注的重点。
空海一体战首要的也是最重要的成就是，获得了民众对反介入/区域封锁挑战的关注，特别是抗衡中国军事力量和维持亚洲日益恶化的军事平衡的需要。
要想唤起人们对ASB的重视，第一步是承认存在的问题。很难相信，在不到十年前，这些问题没有得到大多数国防决策者的关注-将此作为主要规划事项。在“空海一体战”概念诞生之时，“中国”确实是--两位美国海军战争学院教授所说的“美国军事规划的伏地魔”，不过，当时的美国空军和海军都专注于非常规战争，以及对亚洲西南部持续不断冲突的支持。
美国战略团体正在辩论如何正确地回应反介入/区域封锁带来的挑战，以及中国日益增长的军事实力，而不是这些挑战是否存在或是否值得美国关注，这足以说明，“空海一体战”战略值得关注并具有持久意义。
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无论昔日的“空海一体战”概念影响如何，国防部都不能使时光倒流，回到对反介入 /区域封锁以及亚洲军事力量对比失衡感到自满的时代。ASB战略对所面临挑战的重视程度已深入人心。中国仍然是越来越迫近的威胁，但并不是唯一试图阻碍美军行动自由的对手。克里米亚武装人员和中国东海的准军事船只已成为一种新的挑战。人们可能认为，这些挑战是个别的、独立于反介入/区域封锁战略之外的，许多观察家也认为ASB只与“大规模战争”有关。但在现实中，这些挑战是有关连的，比如，通过对其反介入/区域封锁战略覆盖区域功能的升级，克里米亚的侵略者会变的更加肆无忌惮。
因此，美国国防部必须保持其在智力、机构和物质方面的支持，来应对反介入/区域封锁战略的威胁-无论这一概念的名称如何变化。
这些支持应包括为人熟知的ASB战略原则:维持在反介入/区域封锁战略潜在“威胁”区域的部署和行动，加强美国盟友和伙伴的前线行动能力和灵活性，发动C4ISR网络战争，将战斗范围扩展到区域外围，如进行远距离封锁。
五角大楼和美国战略研究团体可以而且应该讨论如何将这些元素适当地融合，除对以上四种方法进行实践，他们的组合和应用还必须遵循总体战略和作战原则。不管国防部如何定义这些策略和概念，它们所反应的问题都需要得到重视，五角大楼不应低估用通俗易懂的言辞向公共和政府决策者解释这些概念的重要性。
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塞缪尔·亨廷顿几十年前曾说，除非军方“可以很好地定义或阐述某些战略概念，否则公众和政府领导人会对军队的角色感到困惑，从而怀疑军队存在的必要性，并对军方索取社会资源持冷漠或敌视态度。
所以，“全球公域介入与机动联合概念”更需要清晰的、令人信服的解释，包括它们需要什么样的资源，为什么需要-因为他们经常与军事个体争夺优先级。空海一体战在这一方面做得很好，它得到了政策制定者的理解并为之提供了空军和海军应对反介入/区域封锁挑战所需的支持。
有理由相信，JAM-GC战略将继续履行这一重要功能。ASB将作为联合概念的一部分，在联合参谋部的监督下，JAM-GC将鼓励陆军和海军陆战队重新审视反介入/区域封锁挑战，地面部队则可以通过跨区域合作，在功能扩展领域取得创新。
不过在实践的过程中，整合性不应以牺牲对创新的重视为代价。尽管追求协同联合大大提升了美军作战效率，但也催生了布莱恩·麦格拉思所描述的“官僚途径和方法论策略，认为达成共识和共同决策…要比风险的综合评估和战略思维更重要”。
与很多人一样，“空海战略”在这种新概念框架下将如何表现，我们将拭目以待。如果它只是演变成对作战人员或决策者没什么用的一个紫色小册子，就说明，美国军方机构的组织理念和国家安全战略的执行有必要进行持续变革。
源文：
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/rip-air-sea-battle-12147
RIP Air-Sea Battle?
The fact that the strategic community is debating the right way to respond to A2/AD and China’s growing military capabilities is a testament to Air-Sea Battle’s success—and why the future of ASB is of critical importance.
J. Randy Forbes
January 29， 2015
Last week， the defense media broke the news that the Pentagon’s “Air-Sea Battle” concept is being renamed and absorbed into a broader multiservice effort to develop a “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons” or JAM-GC.
Individual news reports have used a variety of verbs to describe what is happening to Air Sea Battle， but the headline of the first article was also the most blunt.
“DoD Kills Air-Sea Battle，” it said—and I fear it might be right. Maybe it is just a name change， but I am concerned that incorporating “the concept formerly known as Air-Sea Battle” into the highly bureaucratic joint concept development process could stifle innovation and dilute the concept’s focus.
If Air-Sea Battle has indeed been killed， it would seem appropriate to mark its passing by reflecting on the life and death of ASB: what it accomplished， what remains to be done， and what we should learn from its fate. Such a eulogy may well be premature.
I hope it is， and that the concept’s development will continue and benefit， like Tom Sawyer， from the discussion and debate resulting from the news of its demise. With that objective in mind， I offer my personal thoughts on the concept below.
It is difficult to eulogize Air-Sea Battle because if there is one thing that most observers can agree upon regarding Air-Sea Battle， it is that “the concept” has always been poorly understood. But one thing that most versions of ASB have had in common is an explicit focus on overcoming anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) challenges， and an implicit focus on the pacing threat posed by China’s rapid development of extensive A2/AD capabilities.
In my view， Air-Sea Battle’s first and most significant accomplishment was in calling attention to these A2/AD challenges and， in particular， the increasingly dire need to offset the remarkable growth in China’s military power and stabilize the deteriorating military balance in Asia.
The first step to recovery is admitting that you have a problem， as they say， and Air-Sea Battle came as badly needed intervention at a critical point. It is hard to believe today that less than a decade ago， these issues did not appear on most defense policy makers’ radar as major planning considerations.
But at the birth of Air-Sea Battle， “China” truly was what two U.S. Naval War College professors called “the Voldemort of U.S. military planning”—he who must not be named—and both the Air Force and Navy were focused on irregular warfare， as well as supporting the ongoing conflicts in Southwest Asia.
The fact that the strategic community now finds itself debating the right way to respond to the challenges posed by A2/AD and China’s growing military capabilities and not whether or not those challenges even exist or deserve our attention is a testament to Air-Sea Battle’s success in changing the debate and to its enduring significance.
Whatever happens to the erstwhile Air-Sea Battle， the Department of Defense must not turn back the clock and return to complacency on A2/AD and the deteriorating military balance in Asia. The challenges ASB was intended to address have only solidified over the course of the concept’s brief life. China remains the pacing threat， but it is not the only competitor seeking to deny our power-projection forces freedom of maneuver and action.
At the same time， a new type of challenge has arisen in the form of “creeping” or “gray-zone” aggression， whether by “little green men” in the Crimea or paramilitary vessels in the East China Sea. It may be tempting to view these challenges as distinct and separate from A2/AD and the “big war” that many observers associated with ASB.
But in reality， the challenges are linked， with creeping aggressors feeling emboldened by the escalation dominance they enjoy in areas covered by their A2/AD capabilities.
It is therefore imperative that the Department of Defense sustain its intellectual， organizational and material efforts to counter and overcome A2/AD—whatever the moniker attached to them.
These efforts should include the familiar tenets of ASB: sustaining operations inside the A2/AD “threat bubble，” bolstering the capability and resilience of our allies and partners on the front lines， waging C4ISR network battles， fighting from range and holding out the possibility of peripheral operations such as a distant blockade.
The Pentagon and the strategic-studies community can and should debate the appropriate mixture of these elements， but all four are needed， and their combination and application must be guided by overarching strategies and operational concepts.
DoD can call these strategies and concepts whatever it desires， but words do matter， and the Pentagon should not underestimate the importance of speaking in plain terms to the broader public and civilian policy makers.
Samuel Huntington argued decades ago that unless each Service articulated a “well defined strategic concept， the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service， uncertain as to the necessity of its existence and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society.”
Joint initiatives are in even greater need of a clear， compelling story about what resources they require and why， since they often compete with individual services’ own priorities. Air-Sea Battle told such a story in a way that helped civilian policy makers understand and provide what the Air Force and Navy needed to address the evolving A2/AD challenge.
I am hopeful that the JAM-GC will continue to fulfill this important function. I also am hopeful that expanding ASB into a fully joint concept under Joint Staff supervision will encourage the Army and Marine Corps to take a fresh look at A2/AD challenges and the novel and expanded roles that ground forces with cross-domain capabilities could play in mitigating them.
But full， four-service jointness should not be prioritized at the expense of focus and innovation. Although Goldwater-Nichols and the quest for jointness have greatly improved the effectiveness of our military， they have also spawned what Bryan McGrath has described as “bureaucratic approaches to force structure and strategy that value consensus and collegiality over… assessing coherent risks and thinking strategically.”
Along with many others， I will be watching to see how “the concept formerly known as Air Sea Battle” fares in this environment. If it is turned into another purple booklet of little use to either the warfighter or the policy maker， it will reinforce my belief that substantial changes in the way we are organized to develop and execute national-security strategy are needed.
作者: nebula 时间: 2015-1-29 23:15
标题: 赞
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