具体来说，无论当前中国是否有意，蓬勃发展的商业、中国海外公民人身安全都需要保护，这些将不可避免地促进中国人民解放军(PLA)的现代化，朝着有限度的全球力量投射发展。尽管中国领导层对这个方向的发展仅有非常有限的目标，若规则改变，中国如何及何时使用武力的思维也会随之改变。
我认为商业发展、国内和国际形势将推动解放军越来越多的全球存在，这并不等同于参与国外主要战争和驻扎军队。如果我们按照美国标准来定义全球军事强国的话，没有哪个国家能称得上。这里的问题并不是中国是否会有能力入侵和占领遥远的国家，因为只有美国可以；而是，是否像其他二线力量，有能力向海外投送有限且有效的兵力。
中国企业创造了战略需求
在不久的将来，经济发展将推动中国有限度的全球力量投射。全球180多个国家和地区大约分布有20000家中国企业，这使得政府不得不考虑保护这些资产。此外，中国海外投资不断增长：2011年中国对外直接投资是2005年总量的20倍，达600亿美元。
随着中国投资增加，威胁这些资产的因素也将增加。尤其在政治上不稳定的国家，国有化或侵占总是可能的；或在持续领土冲突的国家，反华抗议往往导致中资财产受损。虽然是个别事件，最近的事件推动中国发展有限的远征能力，来增加回应选项。
这些事件越来越频繁地发生，越来越威胁到中国的战略和政治利益。中国政府和军方就此发表声明承认，中国需要资源通道的畅通，另外，海外投资的爆炸式增长，已将中国利益延伸到海外，然而保护能力却跟不上。
王毅在他作为中国外交部长的第一次演讲中，提出了在外交政策方面的形势和原则，强调外交政策与扩大的全球利益要保持一致。中国2013年发布的国防白皮书中指出，中国的海外利益“安全风险在不断增加”，且首次增设章节，写明要保护中国的海外利益。最近几个月，中国国家主席习近平本人也公开强调，强大的军事力量、成功的外交政策至关重要，要摈弃被动的选择。
中国公众的国内支持
越来越多的中国公民，作为部分出口劳动力，或为追求经济利益，去了政治不稳定的国家。截止2014年5月的前12个月，中国公民海外旅行达9800万次，过去四年这一数据以平均每年超过1000万的速度在增加。预计到2020年，大约有1.5亿名中国公民将去国外旅行和生活。相比之下，2014年大约分别有5700万和630万的美国人在国外旅行、居住。
由于东道主国家的政治不稳定和运气不佳，越来越多的中国人发现自己处境危险，国内公众支持发展远征能力的呼声也逐渐增多。据中国外交部称，大使馆和领事馆平均每天处理100起关于海外侨胞身处危险的案例。网民已经开始抱怨政府过于依赖增强公民危险意识和公民保护外交机制，而不是使用武力。
在载有157名中国公民的MH370消失后，中国政府组建联合搜救队作为回应，中国知名人士称，“中国参与境外安全营救的能力仍然远远落后于发达国家，中国有理由和权利将危机和挑战转化为契机，建立安全部队保护海外利益。”
Nuclear Powered Attack Submarine of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Na.jpg (355.55 KB, 下载次数: 13)
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“负责任的利益相关者”得到国际认可
除了商业需求和国内压力外，中国领导人希望创建一个积极的国际形象，这样会更有利于发展全球远征能力。国际上要求中国承担更多全球责任的声音，为解放军有限度的远征行动提供了适当理由。即使在短期内、相对宽松的环境中，中国在全球范围的军事投送能力，也能够执行许多维和任务，以及人道主义援助和救灾行动。中国对外宣布希望承担更多责任，也会为战力投射能力的发展，提供一个合法、不具威胁的理由。
更强大、更具全球影响力的中国
有效的全球投送能力建设并非一帆风顺。中国军方远程投送能力，即使仅是有限的规模，也会有诸如技术、政治，和意识形态的阻碍。学者经常指出若今天中国不解决这些障碍，明天依然会有障碍。诚然，解放军这样的远征行动经验有限。而且，中国目前没有海外基地，没有远程后勤保障，卫星覆盖也很勉强。远征能力所需的关键环节：空运，海运、C4ISR（指挥、控制、通信、计算机、情报、监视、侦察），及后勤保障，中国都是很脆弱的。
但我们不应忘记，在本世纪初时，中国航母的想法或中国参与维和行动，似乎都具有高度争议，或仅仅是在设想。如果中国在合理平台、技术领域，如大型运输机、加油机；两栖战斗舰、医院船和码头登陆平台；天基海洋监测系统等方面投资，将更有可能实现全球有限度的投送。当然，获得必要的军事平台，是非常艰巨、明显的挑战，但它只是解放军的一个难题，解放军还需要解决组织上的障碍。
未来十年解放军全球远征的确切形态和功能仍不确定，但繁荣的商业贸易，国内和国际形势，将迫使中国重塑解放军战力，来保护中国公民、海外利益及保持其信誉。尽管中国政府的动机可能相对狭窄，新扩展的解放军能力，对于传统的作战目标以及未来的战略利益，将产生更广泛的影响。具体地说，在全球范围内有限度的远征行动能力可能会影响中国的不干涉政策和地区稳定。
一旦解放军有能力干预海外，随着全球行动，意识形态壁垒已经放松，中国领导可能会进行更多的干预。一个更加自信的中国对美国可能是有利的，尤其是与其在一系列问题上合作，如能源安全，中东稳定及气候变化。未来的情况可能是，随着中国全球利益扩张，甚至与美国利益重叠，中国会放松其不干涉内政原则，进而中、美两国在全球性问题上协调合作，但有三点质疑这一理想结果的可行性。
首先，朝鲜核问题已经证明，即使中、美两国利益重叠，首选策略出现分歧仍会抑制问题的进展。其次，中国仅从国内角度来定义核心利益，而美国更倾向于从维护当前全球秩序的角度来看问题。最后，放弃不干涉原则来促进新的全球投送任务，意味着中国未来潜在的干涉主义，相比之下，美国可能更喜欢中国的传统不干涉政策。
在地区稳定方面，尽管中国领导人可能只计划建立远征军应对非传统威胁，然而投送能力增加有利于实现中国利益，也是实现传统区域安全的好办法。然而对美国及其地区盟友和合作伙伴的影响却不确定。中国在全球事务中增加军事作用，并且增强的远征能力，可以实现与亚洲邻国达成平衡，但也会导致地区的不稳定，随着地区力量平衡快速变化，战争的诱因也在增加。
中国可能变得自信，特别是加上国内的支持，会认为实现其目标可以仅靠蛮力。然而，一支具备全球远征的解放军，也可以塑造一个更为自信的中国，提供国际公共产品，进一步使北京适应当前世界秩序，从而减少使用武力来解决争端的诱因。
任何对未来意图和能力的推测都有不确定性。但只要中国继续两位数增加国防开支，GDP持续、甚至温和增长，中国应该能够同时发展传统的作战能力与全球远征能力，来解决区域的挑战和应对远离家门的威胁。然而冲突或持久的地区问题决议可能会延缓或加速这个愿景，但不太可能逆转解放军日益全球化这一趋势。
来源：亚洲防务新闻
原文：
Why China Will Become a Global Military Power
For over a decade， academics， policymakers， and government officials have been engaged in a relentless debate about Chinese military capabilities and intentions. To some， China is likely an expansionist country akin to Germany before WWI. Others argue that China’s assertive behavior in its regional offshore island disputes is simply a manifestation of the Chinese Communist Party’s focus on domestic stability， which precludes any broader global ambitions.
Mastro photo Contrary to the extremes of the current debate，the Chinese military will be neither hollow nor a juggernaut. While the Chinese leadership would prefer to stay focused on internal development and regional issues，I argue in a recent article in The National Interest that facts on the ground will increasingly compel the Party to develop some global operational capabilities.
Specifically， the burgeoning need to protect commercial assets and Chinese nationals abroad will inevitably shape modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) toward limited global power projection， regardless of its current plans or intentions. Even though the Chinese leadership will embark on this path with very limited goals in mind， Chinese thinking on how and when to use force could change once its strategy， doctrine， and capabilities evolve to incorporate these new roles.
While I posit that commercial， domestic， and international drivers will push the PLA to have an increasing global presence， this does not equate to fighting major wars and stationing troops abroad. If we define global military power by the standard of the United States， no country qualifies. The question here is not whether China would have the capacity to invade and occupy far-off countries， as only the United States can； but whether， like other second-tier powers， it will develop the capacity to project limited but meaningful force outside its immediate region.
Chinese Companies Create the Strategic Demand
In the near future， economic motivations will drive the development of China’s limited global power projection capabilities. Approximately 20，000 Chinese companies have a presence in more than 180 countries and regions， creating a constant demand for government protection of these assets. Furthermore， Chinese overseas investment is growing： at US$60 billion， China’s annual outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in 2011 was 20 times the 2005 amount.
As Chinese investments increase， threats to those assets will increase in tandem. This is particularly the case in politically unstable countries where nationalization or seizure is always a possibility， or in countries that have ongoing territorial conflicts where anti-China protests have often resulted in damage to Chinese-owned property. While still a fledging phenomenon， there are recent examples of instances that could drive China to develop limited expeditionary capabilities to augment its response options.
These incidents are occurring more frequently and are increasingly threatening to the Party’s strategic and political interests. Statements made by the Chinese political and military leadership acknowledge that China’s need for stable access to natural resources in addition to exploding foreign investment have expanded its interests beyond the region， while their capabilities lag behind.
Wang Yi in his first speech as China’s foreign minister outlined trends and principles in foreign policy， highlighting the need to align China’s foreign policy with its expanding global interests. China’s 2013 Defense White Paper noted that “security risks to China’s overseas interests are on the increase” and included for the first time a section on protecting Chinese overseas interests. And in recent months， China’s president Xi Jinping himself has publicly stressed the critical importance of a strong military to a successful foreign policy and dismissed the option of passivity.
The Chinese Public Creates the Domestic Support
An increasing number of Chinese citizens are going abroad，with many migrating to politically unstable countries as part of an exported labor force or in prospect of financial gain. In the 12 months leading up to May 2014， Chinese nationals recorded 98 million overseas trips—a number that has increased by an average rate of over 10 million a year for the last four years. By 2020，approximately 150 million Chinese citizens will be traveling and living abroad. In comparison， approximately 57 million Americans traveled abroad in 2014 and 6.3 million Americans live overseas.
Domestic public support for the development of expeditionary capabilities is coalescing as more and more Chinese nationals find themselves in dangerous situations due to a combination of
misfortune and political instability in host nations. According to the Chinese government’s foreign ministry，its embassies and consulates deal with an average of 100 incidents a day regarding overseas Chinese nationals in danger. Netizens have begun to complain that the government relies too heavily on enhancing citizen awareness of dangers and diplomatic mechanisms for citizen protection，rather than using military force.
A prominent Chinese public intellectual noted in the aftermath of the disappearance of flight MH370，which was carrying 157 Chinese nationals and to which the Chinese government responded by launching joint search-and-rescue teams，that “China’s capacity to engage in security operations outside its national boundary still lags far behind” developed countries and that “China has all the reason and right to turn the crisis and challenge into an opportunity to build up its security forces’ capacity to protect overseas interests.”
‘Responsible Stakeholder’ Creates the International Approval
In addition to commercial demand and domestic pressure，the Chinese leadership’s desire to create a positive international image could provide additional incentives to develop global expeditionary capabilities. International pressure for China to take on more global responsibilities organically creates international support for PLA expeditionary operations of a limited nature. A Chinese military with the ability to project power globally，even if only for a short period of time in relatively permissive environments，could contribute more to peacekeeping missions as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. A proclaimed desire to contribute more to the global good could provide a legitimate and non-threatening rationale for the development of power projection capabilities.
A Stronger， More Globally Impactful China?
An effective global capability is not inevitable. There are real obstacles—technological， political， and ideological—to the Chinese military’s capacity to operate abroad，even on a limited scale. Scholars often point to China’s failure to resolve these obstacles today as proof that there will still be impediments tomorrow. Admittedly，the PLA’s experience with such expeditionary operations has been limited. It holds true that China currently has no bases abroad，no long-range logistics capabilities，and rudimentary satellite coverage. China is particularly weak in the key enablers required for expeditionary capability：airlift，sealift，C4ISR (command，control， communication，computers，intelligence，surveillance，reconnaissance)，and logistics.
But we should not forget that at the turn of this century，the idea of China with an aircraft carrier or Chinese participation in peacekeeping operations seemed highly contentious and hypothetical. If China invests in the right platforms and technologies—such as large transport aircraft and tankers；amphibious combat ships；hospital ships and landing dock platforms；and a robust，space-based ocean surveillance system—conducting limited global operations will become more probable. At the same time，while acquiring the requisite military platforms and units is a formidable and obvious challenge，it is only one piece of the puzzle—the PLA will also have to address organizational and doctrinal impediments.
The exact shape and capabilities of a global expeditionary PLA in a decade or so remains uncertain and contingent. But powerful commercial， domestic， and international drivers will compel the Party to reshape the PLA in order to protect Chinese interests and nationals overseas and maintain its credibility. While Beijing’s motivations may be relatively narrow，such new and expansive PLA capabilities will have much wider implications for its traditional war-fighting goals as well as for future articulations of strategy and interests. Specifically，the ability to conduct limited expeditionary operations on a global scale could impact China’s non-interference policy and regional stability.
Once the PLA has the capabilities to intervene abroad，and ideological barriers have been loosened with global operations，the Chinese leadership may become more interventionist. A more assertive China may be a positive development for the United States，especially if it leads to greater Chinese cooperation on issues such as energy security，stability in the Middle East，and climate change. One possible future scenario is that China relaxes its non-interference principle as its global interests expand and overlap with those of the United States，leading to coordination between the two countries on global issues. But there are three reasons to question the feasibility of this ideal outcome.
First，as the North Korean nuclear issue has demonstrated，even when Chinese and American interests overlap，divergence in their preferred tactics can inhibit progress on the issue at hand. Second，China defines its core interests narrowly in domestic terms while the United States is more likely to view issues from the perspective of maintaining the current global order. Last，abandonment of the non-intervention principle to facilitate its new global expeditionary mission would mean the potential for Chinese interference in issues in which the United States may prefer China’s traditional hands-off approach.
In terms of regional stability，while the Chinese leadership may only plan on building expeditionary forces to address non-traditional threats，the increased capabilities may shape Chinese interests and preferred methods of achieving traditional regional security objectives. The implications for the United States and its regional allies and partners are uncertain. China’s increased military role in global affairs and enhanced expeditionary capabilities could create a balancing backlash among its Asian neighbors and contribute to instability in the region，as incentives for preventive war increase with the rapid shifts in the regional balance of power.
China could become confident in its ability to achieve its objectives by brute force alone，especially with domestic support. However，a global expeditionary PLA could also create a more assertive China that is positioned to provide international public goods，further enmeshing Beijing into the current world order and reducing the incentives for it to use force to resolve disputes.
Any projection about future intent and capabilities is contingent and uncertain. But as long as China continues its double-digit annual increases in defense spending，and GDP growth continues even modestly，China should be able to simultaneously develop traditional war-fighting capabilities to address regional challenges as well as global expeditionary capabilities to confront threats farther from home. While flare-ups or resolutions of persistent regional issues may delay or accelerate this future scenario，they are unlikely to reverse China’s increasingly global PLA.
作者: 重修 时间: 2015-1-24 14:45
作者: 铁路炮 时间: 2015-1-24 15:02
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