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The DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) has generated a tremendous amount of interest over the past five years. If it works, it poses a very serious threat to U.S. Navy (USN) carriers, as well as to the other advanced warships of the USN, of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, and others.
在过去五年里，东风-21D 反舰弹道导弹引发了人们的广泛关注。如果该导弹确实可行，它不仅会严重威胁到美国海军(USN)的航空母舰，还会威胁到美国海军和日本海上自卫队以及其他国家的先进战舰。
An anti-ship ballistic missile is more than just a missile; it requires a broad, sophisticated support system. Unlike a missile launched at static targets, a carrier-killing ASBM requires terminal guidance, as it must revise its flight path after reentering the atmosphere.
反舰弹道导弹不仅仅是一枚导弹, 它还需要一套广泛的、复杂的支撑配套体系。与针对静态目标的导弹不同, 反舰航母导弹需要进行末端制导, 它必须在重返大气层后改变飞行路径。
From launch to strike, the flight of an ASBM can take fifteen or so minutes, at which time the carrier in question will have more than likely moved its position on the open ocean.
The missile thus needs to be adjusted remotely or needs to have the capacity to identify the carrier on its own. Both of these processes depend on the operation of a sophisticated set of sensors, as well as a communication system capable of integrating these sensors and transmitting information to shooters.
从发射到打击, 一枚反舰导弹的飞行时间为15分钟左右，在这段时间里, 被当做目标的航空母舰可能会在公海上移动。所以，需要对这种远程导弹作出调整或者导弹本身需具备识别航母的能力。
这两个过程都依赖于一套复杂的传感器以及能够集成这些传感器并将信息传送给发射人员的通信系统。
As Andrew Erickson emphasizes, “the successful achievement of high-quality, real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data and fusion as well as reliable indigenous satellite navigation and positioning would facilitate holding enemy vessels at risk via devastating multi-axis strikes .”
安德鲁·埃里克森强调说，“高质量、实时的卫星图像和目标定位数据融合，以及可靠的自主卫星导航和定位系统的成功应用-将对敌方船只形成威胁-通过毁灭性的多轴打击。”
The USN is very concerned about the DF-21D, which is one reason it’s working so hard on ship-borne anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology. The USN is also working on other countermeasures, including strikes on DF-21 launch sites at the onset of war (potentially delivered from nuclear cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), and electronic warfare.
美国海军USN非常担心DF-21D所带来的威胁，这也是它如此卖力研究舰载反弹道导弹(ABM)技术的原因之一。USN也在致力于研究其他对抗措施, 包括在战争爆发的初始阶段应对DF-21的打击(可能来自核巡航导弹潜艇SSGNs)和电子战。
This is why it’s so important to emphasize the importance of the ancillary ISR and communication system that make the DF-21D possible. The US doesn’t need to destroy ever launcher, or shoot down every missile in flight. Both of those represent important capabilities, but the key task is to disrupt the system that supports the missile, making it hard for China to identify, target, and strike US carrier groups.
这也是美国强调辅助情报、监视、侦察(ISR)系统和通信系统(DF-21D发挥作用的必要条件)重要性的原因。美国不需要破坏发射器或击落飞行中的每一枚导弹-虽然具备这两种能力很重要, 但关键任务是：破坏导弹的支撑系统, 使中国很难识别、瞄准并攻击美国航母战斗群。
No one knows what would happen if the Second Artillery launched a salvo of DF-21Ds at a US carrier battle group. Some percentage (depending on reliability) would invariably go astray without US help. US escorts would shoot down some percentage with ship-board ABM systems. Electronic disruption would cause some to plunge harmlessly into the ocean. And finally, some might hit a carrier, or hit carrier escorts. A successful hit will almost certainly result in at least a “mission kill,” disabling a US carrier for the remainder of the conflict.
如果中国二炮部队向美国航空母舰战斗群齐射DF-21D，没有人知道会发生什么。如果不了解美国的策略, 一般人都会错误地认为，这些DF-21D(取决于可靠性)都是百发百中。 其实，利用舰载反弹道导弹系统，美国的护航舰队可以击落一部分DF-21D。电子干扰也会致使一些导弹掉进大海。不过，到最后，有些导弹还是有可能击中航母或护航舰队。几乎肯定的是，一次成功的打击至少会击中“一艘航母”，使得冲突中的美国航母失去应对能力。
Anti-Access System of System
It bears emphasis that Chinese carrier-killing capabilities constitute a system of systems, not dependent upon any particular weapon. The rest of China’s system of systems includes nuclear and conventional submarines, medium and long range strike aircraft, surface warships, and land-based cruise missile installations. These platforms can launch a wide array of weapons, most importantly China’s vast arsenal of cruise missiles.
反介入系统集成
值得强调的是, 中国的反航母能力已实现了系统集成-不会依赖于某种特定的武器。集成系统中的其他系统有核潜艇和常规潜艇, 中、远程攻击机、水面舰艇和陆基巡航导弹设施。这些平台可以发射一系列的武器, 最重要的是它们可以使用中国庞大的巡航导弹武器库。
In sufficient numbers, all of these can threaten to kill a carrier. In a shooting war we could expect China to use all of these systems, or to graduate their use depending on political and military developments. Some of these are more easily countered than others, while some pose greater costs to the Chinese.
For example, any surface ship launching a cruise missile at a USN carrier group can likely expect quick destruction. Similarly, both aircraft and submarines would face a high rate of attrition while making attacks on US ships and installations.
如果数量足够, 所有这些武器均可成为航母杀手。我们可以预测，中国会在热战中使用这些系统, 或者会根据政治和军事发展情形将其分级。不过，其中有些武器比较容易遭到反击，还有一些则会带来高昂的成本。 例如, 任何发射巡航导弹的水面舰艇-针对美国海军的航母战斗群-都可能迅速被解体。 同样, 在攻击美国船只和设施的过程中，飞机和潜艇也将面临高磨损风险。
ASBMs have some obvious advantages over these other systems. Operating from land bases, the DF-21D can strike carrier groups at greater range (1000+ miles) than any cruise missile. US air defense systems were designed to defend against Soviet cruise missile attacks, but a ballistic missile attack is a different prospect entirely. While the US can strike land bases, China can defend these targets more heavily through active and passive measures that it can protect relatively fragile ships and aircraft.
与些系统相比，反舰导弹有着明显的优势。陆基发射的DF-21D可以打击航母战斗群-射程比巡航导弹更远(可达1000多英里)。美国建设防空系统的初衷是抵御苏联巡航导弹袭击, 但应对弹道导弹的攻击则是完全不同的情形。尽管美国可以打击陆上基地, 但通过主动和被动防护措施，中国可以保护这些目标以及保护相对脆弱的船只和飞机。
美国的反应
US Responses
The development of the DF-21D may have contributed to the USN’s decision to focus on air defense ships (such as the Arleigh Burke Flight III) capable of ballistic missile interception, at the expense of such platforms at the Littoral Combat Ship and the DDG-1000. But as suggested earlier, the United States has also looked into other options, including SSGN launched cruise missiles and hypersonic strike vehicles designed to attack Chinese bases before the Second Artillery can launch the missiles. The United States is also, presumably, working on cyber, electronic, and physical means of disrupting China’s recon and communications systems.
DF-21D的发展使得USN开始关注防空舰艇 (比如“阿里·伯克级Flight III驱逐舰)的建设，并且开始发展拦截弹道导弹的能力-其支撑平台为濒海战斗舰以及DDG- 1000级海军舰艇。但正如前面所述,美国也考虑其他选项, 包括从巡航导弹核潜艇发射的攻击型巡航导弹和超音速攻击武器-在第二炮兵可以发射导弹之前于攻击中国基地。据推测，美国也在致力于网络、电子和常规手段的研究-扰乱中国的侦察和通信系统。
Nevertheless, some have suggested that the DF-21D has rendered the supercarrier obsolete. While it depends on how we use the term “obsolete,” it’s probably too early to make that claim. China has expended vast time and resources determining how to kill US carriers, which suggests that the Chinese military takes carrier capabilities seriously.
然而, 一些人认为：对于超级航空母舰来说，DF-21D已经过时了。不过这取决于我们如何定义“被淘汰”这一术语, 做出这样的一段可能为时过早。中国已经花费大量的时间和资源，研究如何打击美国航母, 这充分展示了中国军方对航母的重视程度。
Moreover, the number of countries with both the interest and technical capability to develop the system of systems necessary to operate an ASBM is probably limited to two for the foreseeable future, with only Russia joining China.
此外, 在可预见的未来，一些国家会出于利益和技术需要开发这些集成系统(它们是运行此类导弹的必要条件)，这些国家可能只限于两个国家-俄罗斯和中国。
Still, efforts to diversify US capabilities surely make some sense. SSGNs, equipped with land attack cruise missiles, can pick up a great deal of the slack while remaining relatively safe from attack. Amphibious assault ships, the term the USN uses for its light carrier fleet, can ably carry out much of the “strategic influence” mission that the supercarriers currently provide.
不过, 使美国反措施武器多样化肯定会起到一些作用。配有对地攻击巡航导弹的巡航导弹核潜艇可以在不受攻击的、相对安全的情况下打开突破口。美国海军轻型航母舰队-两栖攻击舰也可巧妙地执行大量的“超级航母战略”任务。
Strategic Relevance
Just because China has ASBMs doesn’t mean that it will use them, even in a shooting war. The point of the “system of systems” is not to use it, but instead to deter the US from going to war. Failing that, it is to deter the USN from aggressively using its carrier groups in combat. Sinking a carrier could kill 6000 Americans in a few minutes, the prospect of which could make the US President reconsider intervention in any dispute with China.
战略相关性
然而，中国拥有导弹并不意味着就会使用他们-即使是在热战中。“系统集成”的目的不是为了将其用于实战, 而是为了遏制美国“参战”的能力。如果不是这样, 就是想阻止美国海军航母编队在战斗中发挥积极作用。击沉航母可在几分钟内使6000人丧命, 这可能会使美国总统重新考虑：干预任何与中国有关的争端。
Moreover, ASBMs and the other assorted systems would make USN admirals very leery about sailing its primary assets into danger. Aircraft carriers don’t just symbolically represent national power, they ARE national power, and the loss of two or three would dramatically cut US capability to intervene anywhere in the world.
此外,反舰导弹和其他各种系统也会让美国海军上将担心-其海上资产面临的航行危险。航母不只象征性地代表着国家权力, 它们本身就是国家权力, 失去两艘或三艘航母会大大损害美国干预世界任何地方事务的能力。
However, The DF-21D will suffer from the same problem as the variety of global strike weapons that the United States and others have considered over the years. A credible threat to kill a US carrier at range is great, but no one has any idea what will happen when the Second Artillery first lets loose with a salvo of ASBMs.
然而, 面对美国和其他国家在过去研制的各种全球性打击武器，DF-21D也会遭遇同样的问题。击沉美国航母是一种可信的威胁, 但威胁是否会转化成现实还是个问题, 没有人知道-当中国第二炮兵部队第一次进行导弹齐射时-会发生什么。
Any medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) launched could carry a nuclear warhead, targeted either at a carrier or some other target. Chinese leadership will have to count on very cool heads in Washington for the fifteen minutes between launch and impact. Much will depend on the extent of contact between Beijing and Washington during the process of escalation; if this process has involved multiple misunderstandings, then launching a missile could lead to a degree of escalation that China has not prepared for.
任何中程弹道导弹(MRBM)都可以携带核弹头, 要么针对航母要么针对其他目标。中国领导人将不得不非常冷静考虑华盛顿的反应-在导弹发射和招致反击之间的15分钟之内。事件是否升级会在很大程度上取决于北京和华盛顿之间的联系程度, 如果这个过程涉及到多个误解, 那么导弹发射可能导致危机一定程度的升级-中国还没有做好应对准备。
At the extreme, launching at a US carrier represents an enormous risk, because it could start a decision-process that would bring full nuclear retaliation from the United States.
在最极端的情况下, 袭击美国航母是一次巨大的冒险, 因为它可能会展开一个决策过程-全部来自美国的核报复。,
That China still lacks a secure second strike capability against the US (and would struggle, in context of a conflict, to safely deploy its ballistic missile submarines) makes the situation even less stable, because the Americans might suspect the PLA of engaging in “use it or lose it” thinking.
中国仍然缺乏可靠的对美二次打击能力(美国会在发生冲突的情况下,安全地部署它的弹道导弹潜艇)，这会让情况更不稳定, 因为美国人可能会认为：解放军陷入了“发动二次打击或放弃”的思考中。
Even if the US correctly assesses the nature and purpose of the attack, the destruction of a carrier could serve to commit the United States, rather than scare it off.
即便美国正确评估出攻击的性质和目的,航母遭遇到的威胁只会刺激美国参战, 而不是把它吓跑。
Conclusion
The ASBM is essentially a sea denial/anti-access weapon, not a sea-control weapon. It cannot prevent the USN from killing Chinese ships, only change the method by which the Americans do so.
结论
反舰弹道导弹本质上是一种海上反介入武器, 而不是一种制海武器。它不能阻止美国海军攻击中国船只, 只能改变美国对付中国船只的方法。
The use of such a weapon in anger would carry the potential for grave escalatory consequences on both sides. It’s difficult to imagine what, besides Taiwan, China and the United States might be willing to tolerate such risk for.
意气用事地使用这样的武器将为双方带来更多潜在的严重后果。很难想象, 除了台湾之外, 中国和美国冒这样的风险赌的是什么。
As such, it’s not entirely clear how transformative the weapon really is. It certainly marks an important contribution to China’s arsenal, and a harbinger of China’s growing power. It’s impact, however, is more incremental than revolutionary, especially in context of the steady growth of China’s other anti-access options.
因此, 并不完全清楚这些武器会带来什么影响。无疑，这是对中国武器库的一个很重要的贡献, 也是中国日益增长力量的标志。不过, 它的影响是递增的，而不是革命性的, 尤其是在中国其他反介入措施稳定增长的背景下。
One implication of the development of this system is the need for establishing a reliable crisis hotline between the US and Chinese governments, along with norms about how leadership will handle such communication in a crisis setting. This may prove a tall order for a pair of governments that remain committed to the public position that war is extremely unlikely.
开发该系统的含义之一还在于：美国和中国政府之间需要建立一条可靠的危机热线, 以及领导人在危机中如何沟通的一些规范。这需要对各国政府的公开立场提出很高的要求-最大限度地阻止战争。
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你不敢打我，你不敢打我，说一万遍自己就信了
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